American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic
Journals

Scholarship & Research

2012

Invisible Cities in Europe
Fernanda Nicola

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons

INVISIBLE CITIES IN EUROPE
Fernanda Nicola
INTRODUCTION
I. INN7SIBLE CITIES IN EU LEAW
A. Two Types of Invisibility
B. Beyond the Fiction of Nonintervention in StateLocal Matters
1. Reverse Discrimination for Which
Communities?
2. Policy Arguments in Internal Market
Adjudication
C. Including Local Stakes in Judicial Balancing
II. THE CITY AND THE INTERNAL MARKET
A. Free Movement for Cities: Maastricht Coffee Shop
B. The Competition Exemption for Cities
C. In-House Exemption to Public Procurement
III. DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF FREE MOVEMENT OF
WORKERS AND STUDENTS
A. Local Effects of Free Movement of Workers
1. Some Distributive Implications of Rijfert
2. Public Policy Exceptions to Free Movement of
Workers
B. Local Effects of the Free Movement of Students
1. The Activist Equal Access to Education
Jurisprudence
2. Some Distributive Implications of Bidar
CONCLUSION

1283
1288
1290
1296
1297
1304
1314
1316
1317
1321
1331
1338
1340
1342
1347
1351
1352
1356
1361

* Associate Professor,Washington College of Law,American University. This Essay
was presented as a paper at "Teaching European ILaw in the United States," Boston
University Law School in 2009, at the panel "From Maastricht to Lisbon: The Evolution
of European Union Instittions and ILaw" at Fordham ILaw School in 2011, and at "The
European Legal Project: New Approaches at Harvard ILaw School in 2012." The Author
is grateftl for wonderful research assistance from Tudor Farcas, Colten Hall, and
Shannon Ramirez, and to the stellar assistance of William Ryan, librarian at the pence
Law Library. All errors are the Author's alone.

1282

2012]

INAITSIBLE CITIES IN EUROPE

1283

INTROD UCTION
With cities, it isas with dreams: evetything imaginable
can be dreamed, but even the most unexpected dream is
a rebus that conceals a desire or. its reverse, a fear.
Cities, like dreams, are made of desires andfears, even
Yf the thread of their discourse is secret, their rules are
absurd, their perspectives deceitful, and everything
conceals something else.'

The recent movements of Occupy Wall Street in London
and Paris, and Los Indignados in Madrid, demonstrate that not
only the European internal market but also global markets are
under attack from social movements promoting alternatives to
neoliberalism. These movements, which are geographically
rooted in cities, yet politically situated between the national and
global markets, promote an alternative political ethos founded
on direct democracy and locally based self-determination.2 Such
groups' critique of contemporary financial capitalism is but one
example of a broader phenomenon explored in this Essay: the

place of local actors and local politics in the jurisprudence of
European market integration. This jurisprudence views cities,
whether resisting or fostering European capitalism, as either
mere subsidiaries of states or as mere private market actors.
1. ITALO CAVINO, INVISIBIE CITIES 44 (William Weaver trans., Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Inc. 1974) (1972). Italo Calvino's book Le Citta lvisibili isa narrative of
diflerent cities that enables Marco Polo and the emperor Kublai Khan to begin their
long conversation, despite linguistic barriers and difterent mentalities between the two.
See
id.
'eneraA
Likewise, despite highly technical EU law doctrines that often overlook
city power, this Essay aims to make more visible the local effects of European
integration on those local services, from education to waste management, that impact
our evelyday life.

2. See Kyle Bella, Bodies inAlliarce: Gender Theorist Judith Butler on the Occupy and
SlutlValk Moveents, TRUTH(UT (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www truth-out.org/bodiesalliancc-gendetr-heorist-tudith
itnt
i
-buti r -occupy- and- s l utalk-m ov e m
e
s / 132388021 0
(interviewingJudith Butler, who said: "Iknow that the three ()upy movements that I
have spoken to are all trying to figure out how to develop an cties in the movement so
that the people there are not just fighting economic inequality and injustice, but are
trying to produce a community that manifests the values of equality and mutual respect
that they see missing in a world that's structured by neoliberal principles.").
3. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. RV.1059. 10991109, 1150-52 (1980) (concluding that the limited ability of cities to solve their own
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This Essay argues that when internal market 4 rules conflict
with city policies in Europe, judges ought to hear their voices.
Even if such views are not ultimately embraced, they are the
expression of political communities, whether resisting or
fostering European capitalism, 5 which ought not be collapsed
with the states nor reduced to private market actors.
European integration is no longer merely driven by markets
but also by its people. The 2010 Treaty of Lisbon introduced
numerous institutional innovations with the goal of
democratizing European governance, such as the European
Citizens' Initiative.b Almost twenty years earlier, the Maastricht
Treaty of 1992 marked an important moment in the process of
democratization of the European Union when it officially
created EU citizenship. Since then, EU citizens have been able
to vote in foreign local elections and participate more actively in
local politics. In addition, through an activist jurisprudence
interpreting the free movement of EU citizens, the Luxembourg
courts have created strong incentives for workers, students, and
problems or control their own development can be solved by giving them real powernot concentrated power, but varied so as to reach all those "aftcted by organized social
life").
4. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 26, 2010 OJ. C 83/47, at 59 [hereinafter TFEU].
5. See DAVB) HARVFY, REBEL CITiES: FROM THE RIGHT TO THF (IY TO THE URBAN
REVOL1UTION 138-39 (2012) ("The right to the city isnot an exclusive individual right,
but a focused collective right. It isinclusive not only of construction workers but also of

all those who facilitate the reproduction of daily life: the caregivers and teachers, the
sewer and subway repair men, tire
plumbers and electricians, the scaffold erectors and
crane operators, the hospital workers and tihe truck, bus, and taxi drivers, the
restaurant workers and the entertainers, the bank clerks and the city
administrators.... But, oirobvious reasons, it is a complicated right partly by virtue of
the Contemporary conditions of capitalist urbanization. as well as because of the nature
of the populations that might actively pursue such a right.... It isat this point that the
world of practical politics fluitfully intersects with the long history of largely anarchistinspired utopian thinking and writing about the cit . ").
6. The European Citizens' Initiatve confers on EU citizens the right to directly
request the European Commission ("Conmission") to submit a proposal to the
European Union for a legal act required for the purpose of iniplementing the Treaties,
after the Commission has examined an initiative that has received the support of at
least one million citizens fr om at least one quarter of the EU Member States. Council
Regulation No. 211/2011 on the Citizens' Initiative, 0J. L 65/1, art. 2(1), at 3; see
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 11 (4), 2010 O.J. C 83/13,
at 21 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]; see also TFEU,supra note 4,art. 24, 2010 O4. C 83,
at 58.

7. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text),July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191
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families to relocate and gain access to local welfare benefits.
Additionally, the Brussels strategy to integrate the markets was
intended to increase people's mobility while at the same time
fostering greater participation in both European and local
policies.
Even though subnational actors are at the forefront of this
bottom-up approach to European integration, cities and local
policies disappear in the jurisprudence of the courts. In
interpreting internal market rules, the local scale is irrelevant to
the Luxembourg courts concerned with balancing Member
States versus European interests or domestic policies versus
individual rights of EU citizens.
Since cities control municipal services that are increasingly
regulated by the internal market, they are often actors in the
proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union
("CJEU" or "Court") and the General Court of the European
Union (collectively "European Courts"). 8 At times these courts
have limited cities' abilities to deviate from national welfare
policies; at other times, they have empowered them to transform
a local policy into a statewide one. Rather than inquiring into
the local effects of each case, European judges have signaled
that they are not willing to intervene explicitly and directly to
change the existing distribution of power between state and
local actors. Such behavior reinforces the idea that the
European Union is either an international law creature that only
deals with the Member State governments, or that the European
Union is a quasi-federal polity according to which the only
relevant actors for its governance are the states and the federal
goverment. A different understanding of European multilevel
governance should entail not only a deep link between the
Union and its Member States, but also with their subnational
actors.
In reality, the legal construction of the internal market,
which is based on a doctrinal architecture including free
movement of goods, capital, services, and workers together with
competition and public procurement rules, has already
8. EU law aflects municipal power through itsinternal market provisions that are
EU competition and public procurement rules, the free movement of goods, workers,
selvices, and the freedom of establishment. See TFEU,sura note 4, arts. 5(3), 6. 2010
O.J. C 83, at 52-53 (enumerating EU internal market shared competences).

1286 FORDHAM LNATERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1282
empowered the European Courts to intervene in state-local
matters. European judges have explicitly empowered Member
States and EU-wide policies, with the result of implicitly favoring
or hindering local interests. In foregrounding the connection
between internal market and subnational actors, which I label
"cities" for the sake of simplicity, this Essay shows how European
adjudication constrains and transforms local actor responses to
the project of market integration. Local policies are either
subsumed into national agendas or reduced to the expression of
profit-seeking corporations. Irrespective of the local stakes in
each decision, cities remain invisible as political communities to
the European judiciary.
By analyzing free movement provisions, competition law,
and public procurement rules, this Essay shows that each judicial
decision involving city policies inevitably redistributes power and
resources between subnational actors and the states. With this in
mind, judges can make cities visible: they can address the
normative and distributive impact of their decisions rather than
relying on a fiction of nonintervention in state-local matters.
Part I of this Essay analyzes the fiction of nonintervention,
according to which the European Courts supposedly do not
intervene in state-local matters. In interpreting the doctrine of
"wholly internal'" situations, judges have carved out a purely
domestic sphere in which EU law cannot intervene. Such
interpretation promotes an understanding of the European
Union and its Member States as two independent and
autonomous spheres of power.'0 The policy arguments that
judges have used to interpret internal market rules have
construed cities as subdivisions of the state rather than self-

9. See Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Free Movenent oJ Persons and the 1W1ho
lnteral Rule:
Time to Move on0, 39 (OMMON MKT. L. RLV. 731 (2002) (discussing th
hlly
o
internal" rule employed by the Court of justice of the European Union (C(IEU" or
"Court") and the General Court of the European Union (collectively "European
(ourts")): c. Alina Trytonidou, Reverse Disc rinatio- in Pure! I-te,l Situations. An
Incongluity in a Citizens' Europe, 35
C;AI ISUFS EGON. INTEGRATION 43 (2008)
(referring to this principle as "purely internal").
10. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RiSL ANt
THOUGHT (2006).
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governing bodies, or as private actors competing for services in
the internal market rather than political communities."1
Part II shows how, in their free movement jurisprudence,
the European Courts initially limited the ability of cities to
deviate from national welfare policies but later demonstrated
greater sensitivity to the internal conflicts in Member States over
particular social policies. More recently, in the notorious
JV1aastrichtCoffee Shop case, the CJEU confused a specific city and
European goal, the elimination of drug tourism, with a national
Netherlands
goal,
triggering
considerable
municipal
opposition. '2
In
their
competition
and
public
procurement
jurisprudence, the European Courts have conceived cities as
private actors subject to all internal market constraints. The
private actor analog} used by the Courts has discouraged
municipal public-private cooperation and city collaboration with
unions. 13

Part III of this Essay illustrates how at times judicial
decisions favoring free movement have strengthened Member
State power at the expense of city power, while at other times,
they have favored city policies that depart from state policies
when the latter conflict with EU goals. As a consequence, EU
adjudication has dramatically affected local policies by shrinking
local subsidies or by empowering a particular city policy to
overcome the internal opposition in influencing the outcomes
of statewide legislation.
Despite the fiction of nonintervention in state-local matters,
by empowering or limiting cities' abilities to adopt welfare
11. In the United States at the beginning of the twentieth centr), the Supreme
Court developed a similar legal interpretation in Hunter v.Pittsburg; in which it defined
citics as "subdivisions of the state" while granting autonomy to ctiLes only when acting
in their proproetary rather than their goverinmental capacity. 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
For a comparative analysis, see Fernanda (. Nicola, 'Crewtures oJ he State. RegultoP"
Federalism, Local Immunities, and E Waste R,gulation in Comparative Pespectie, in
(OMPARATvL AD\MINISTRAT\LV LAW 161, 161-81 (Susan RosteAckcrman & Peter
lindseth eds., 2010).
12. Joscmans v.Burgemncester van Maasuicht, Case C-137/09, [2010] E.(.R. I
(delivered D1c. 16, 2010) (not yct reported); see Suzanne Daley, A Dutch City Seeks to
End Drug T uism,N. TiMFS, Akug. 18, 2010, at A l.
13. See, e.g.,
Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v.Comune di Cingia de' Botti,
Case C-231/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-7287; Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova SpA v.
Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA (,Mere), Case C-179/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5889.
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legislation, European adjudication has dramatically reshaped
the powers and redistributed the resources of cities vis L vis
other municipalities, regions, and their central governments.
I. INVISIBLE CITIES IA EU LAW
Contemplating these essential landscapes, Kublai
reflected on the invisible order that sustains cities, on
the rules that decreed how they rise, take shape and
proser, adapting themselves to the seasons, and then
4
how they sadden and]fall in ruins.
Two main theories of European integration view the
European Union as either an intergovernmental organization
based on states' bargaining,1 5 or as a quasi-federal union driven
by
supranational
institutions.16
According
to
the
intergovernmentalist theory, the key actors of EU law are the
states whose goals shape but are at the same time in tension with
the international institutions they have created. 7 Likewise, the
quasi-federal narrative, which resonates with the US "dual
federalism" doctrine, has singled out the states and the federal
government as the main actors of the supranational legal order.
In both theories, the impact of European adjudication on cities
remains an invisible factor, because subnational governments do
not receive or shape the interpretation of EU law. This is a
matter of Member States, supranational institutions, such as the
European Commission ("Commission"), the Council of the
14. CAIVINO, supra note 1, at 122.
15. See generally ANDREW MOIRAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR Et ROPE: SOCIAI PU RPOSE
AND STATE POWER FROM MlSSNATO MAASTRICHT (1998); Andrew Moravcsik, Preference
and Power in the European Commrity: A Liberallntetg'overnmertalApproach,31 J.(OMON
MKT. STUD. 473 (1993).

16. See generally EUROPEAN INTEGITJON AND SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE
(Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 1998);J. H. H. WEIER, THE CONSTITUTION
O UEUROPE (1999).

17. For a discusion of this traditional appioach in international law, see generally
Srilal M. Perera, ate
I Responsibility: scaining th Liability of States in Foreign Investment
Disputes. 6 J. WORLD INVESTIENT & TKADL 499 (2005). For an alternative approach to
advocating that subnational actors are increasingly becoming actors of international
law, see generally Yishai Blank, Loahsr in ,heNew Global Legal Orde, 47 HARV. INT'l
L.1. 263 (2006); Yishai Blank, The City and the World, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 875
(2006); Gerald E. Frug & David I. Barron, InternationalLocal Government Law, 38 UR.
lAW. 1 (2006).
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European Union, or the European Parliament, and more
recently of European citizens when bestowed with individual
rights by EU law. Even though subnational policies often
encroach upon the functioning of the internal market so that
cities become actors in the judicial proceedings before the
European Courts, judges have either collapsed local into state
interests or they have reduced cities to mere private actors18 In
balancing the conflicting interests of the European Union and
its Member States, judges have rendered cities invisible in the
internal market.
In interpreting the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union ("TFEU") provisions on the four freedoms of
movement (capital, goods, services, and workers), competition
law, and public procurement rules," European Courts have
made clear their reluctance to intervene in state-local matters.
On several occasions, the CJEU has expressed its reluctance to
intervene in state-local matters by failing to recognize the
authority of local actors to act independently from their
respective Member States. The Court has interpreted the
provisions of the initial 1957 Treaty of Rome as crafting a "new
legal order of international lav" that creates obligations for the
Member States Nis a Nis the Union while also creating individual
rights for European citizens that are directly effective in the
domestic legal orders.2
In this triangular relationship
connecting the Union with its Member States and their citizens,
judges have portrayed EU law as shaped only by two
autonomous spheres of power: the Union and the Member
States.
18. See Frug, supra note 3. at 1063. 1100-08 (explaining how the invisibility of
cities in the US constitutional structure has influenced Supreme Courtjurisprudence
to reduce cities to either public actors as "creatures of the State" or as private acLors but
incre market participants).
19. TEU, supr(anote 4, arts. 26, 37, 101-02, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 59, 61, 88-89.
20. In creating the European Community ("Communit y") doctrine of Direct
Eftct, the C EU has confirmed that the Treaty of Rome, as well as regulations and in
certain cases European directives, directly confer individual rights to persons who can
enforce those rights before their domestic court. See Costa v. Ente Nazionale per
l'Energia Electtrica (ENEL), Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585. at 597-98; Van Gend en
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (VJn Gend en Loos), Case 26/62,
[1963] E.C.R. 3, at 12-13 (describing the "new legal order of international law" in
which states have limited their rights and where tire subjects are both the Member
States and their nationals).

1290 FORDHAM INLTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1282
A. Two Types of Invisibility
The invisibility of cities in European adjudication has two
different aspects: a substantive and a procedural one. The
substantive aspect concerns the fact that public associations and
local governments that have important regulatory powers are
invisible to the legal order of the internal market. There is no
intermediate group straddling economic and social relations
between the Union and, the Member States.
Consider European directives, which are a form of
legislation that allow Member States to have some flexibility in
choosing which type of national instrument to implement in
order to achieve a prescribed goal 2 1 While Member States are
legally bound to attain the goal set up by the directives, they
maintain discretion over implementing measures. Despite the
obligations and rights created by EU directives, 22 a major
problem today is the noncompliance with directives, especially
in the environmental field:2- The Commission spent years
addressing how to improve Member State compliance with its
directives and finally in 1993, the Maastricht Treaty introduced a
penalty for failure to comply2 4 In a case involving the
Commission against Greece for noncompliance with several
waste directives, the CJEU rejected the Greek government's
excuse that its internal allocation of power prevented it from
implementing the directives. The Court held that "[a] Member
State may not plead internal circumstances, such as difficulties
of implementation which emerge at the stage when a [European
Community ("Community")] measure is put into effect, to
justify a failure to comply with obligations and time-limits laid
down by Community law."25 This response shows the

21.See PAUL CRAIG & (RINNE DE IM RCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AN) MATERIALS
106 (5th ed. 2011).
22. SeeVan Duyn v.Home Office. Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337.
23. For a more in-depth analysis of this problem, see generally Nicola, supra note
11.
24. TFEU, supra note 4. art. 160. 2010 O.J. C 83, at 118-19; see Commission of the
European Communities, European Governance: White Paper, COM (2001) 428 (July
2001) [hereinafter White Paper] (discussing the introduction of enforcemnent
proceedings to pursue Member StaLCS' noncompliance with Community law).

25. Commission v.Greece, Case C-387/97, [2000] E.C.R. 1-5047,

4.
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unwillingness of the Court to interv ene directly in national-local
2
matters. 6
Likewise, France was sanctioned for the nontransposition of
Directive 2001/18, 27 which seeks to harmonize Member States'
rules regulating the use of genetically-modified organisms
8
("GMOs") and the marketing of GMO-based food products2
The French government excused itself for not putting the
transposition of the directive on the agenda of the National
Assembly stating that "the outdoor cultivation of GMOs has
provoked and continues to provoke violent demonstrations in
France, entailing, inter alia, the uprooting of plants.'"2- In
response, the CJEU held that "a Member State cannot plead
provisions, practices or situations prevailing in its domestic legal
order to justify failure to observe obligations arising under
Community law."' '
In both the Greek and the French cases, the Court did not
recognize local disobedience or internal resistance as a valid
excuse for not implementing the directives. Instead, it punished
the Member States for their noncompliance with monetary
penalties.3I The Court made clear that it was not willing to
intervene in state-local matters and that EU law only recognized
the relationship between the Union and the Member States.
The procedural aspect of the invisibility of city power
concerns whether subnational actors have standing to challenge
EU acts or legislation before the Luxembourg courts. 2 While
city ordinances are often challenged because they conflict with
26. See Nicola, supra note 11. Despite the local noncompliance, the Greck
government was the only entity liable vis a vis the Commission so that in practice, the
penalty becamie an nirnunity for local governments that could refuse to cooperate with
thc implementation of an EU directive without suffiring any retaliation fion Brussels
but certainly not from Athens. See id.
27. Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of thc Council on the
Deliberate Release into thc Environment of Genetically Modified Organisns and
Repealing Council Directive 90i220/EEC, 2001 0J. I 106/ 1.
28. See Connission v. France, Case C-121/07, [2008] E.C.R. 1-9159, 72.
29. Id.: see iNI VEILLE (ITOYLNNLSUR LLS OGM [CITIZEN'S NVATCH GROUP FOR
INFORMATION RELATING TO (MOs], THE FRENCH ILAW ON (MOs:
I AI.ANCED" OR

BIASLD? 2 (2008), available at htLp: //www.infogn.org/1MG/ docnonprot/BrochureLoi
vEnglish.pd.
30. France, [2008] E.C.R. 1-9159, 72.
31. See id. 1[[ 80-89; Greece, [2000] E.C.R. 1-5047. [[ 7-8
32. See TFEU, supra note 4, art. 263, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 162-63 (conferring
jurisdiction upon the (JIEU).
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internal market rules, under the Treaty, subnational actors do
not have privileged standing to review EU law. 33 Futhermore, the
CJEU has denied standing to local actors in the context of stateaid policies, 34 and more recently in cases involving regional or
5
cohesion policy.
For instance, in cohesion policies when regions are in
noncompliance with an approved development plan, the
Commission, which is in charge of disbursing funds, can
suspend or reduce the funding of a project. The Commission's
decision is susceptible to judicial review before the courts if the
applicants have standing.3 6 Several of these cases were raised in
the context of Commission decisions about the allocation or
suspension of payments from the European Regional
Development Fund or other types of EU funds to beneficiary
regions. 7 As to the general standing of municipalities, local
entities and regions, the CJEU has been consistent in holding
33. Id. art. 263, at 162. Like private individuals. local governments are not
privileged actors because they need to show "direct and individual concern." Id.
34. See Consorzio Gruppo di Azione Locale "Murgia Messapica" v. Commission,
Case T-465/93, [1994] E.C.R 11-361, 1[ 57.
35. Cohesion policies link Brussels to its regions by allocating EU fiunds to
regional actors to address the economic imbalances between richest and poorer
regions heightened by the functioning of the internal market. Since the mid-1990s, in
the framework of cohesion policy, tire General Court of the European Union has
reviewed the decisions that the Commission adopted during tire different
implemnentation phass of the structural funds. See Paul Craig, Shared Admiristration.
Disbursement of Community Funds and the Regulatoiy State, in ILEGAL CHAIIENGES IN EU
ADMINISTRATE IAW: TOV-ARDS AN INTEGRATE) ADMINISTRATION 34 (Herwig C.H.
Hofina n & Alexander H. Tuirk eds., 2009); Francesca Struinia, Remedyg the
Inequalities of Econor ic Citizenship in Europe: Cohesion Polity and the Negative Rigid to Move,
17 ER. 1J. 725 (2011).
36. See Joanne Scott, Regional Policy: An Evolutiona,) Perspecive, in THL EVOLUTION
oF EU LAW 625, 636-37 (Paul Craig & Griinne de BuIrca eds., 1992) (commenting on
the lack of legal standing in the General Court of tihe European Union of thre
applicants in Greenpeace & Others v. Commission, Case C-321/95 P, [1998] E.C.R. I1651, and in Greenpeace & Others v. Commission, Case T-585/93, [1995] E.C.R. 112205).
37. See Regione Toscana v. Commission, Case C-180/97, [1997] E.C. R. 1-5245; see
also Ente per le Ville Vesuviane v. Commission, Case T-189/02, [2007] E.C.R. I1-89,
followed by Commission v. Ente per le Ville Vesuviane. Joined Cases C-445/07 P & G
455/07 P. [2009] E.C.R. 1-7993; Regione Siciliana v. Commission, Case C-15/06, [2007]
E.C.R. 1-2591; Regione Siciliana v. Commission, Case C-417/04 1), [2006] E.C.R. 1-3881;
Regione Siciliana v. Commission, Case T-60/03. [2005] E.C.R. 11-4139; Regione
Toscana v. Commission, Case T-81/97. [1998] E.C.R. 11-2889. On cohesion fhnds, see
Koinolita GrammLLatikou v. Commission. Case T-13/08, [2008] E.C.R. 11-211, and
Municfpio de Gondomar v. Commission, Case T-324/06, [2008] E.C.R. 11-173.
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that local governments, unlike the Member States or
supranational institutions, are not privileged applicants to
review Community acts.In interpreting state aid policy, the CJEU laid down the
conditions for the legal standing of the regions. In a well-known
state-aid case, Regione Toscana v. Commission, the Court was
adamant that the region did not have standing to challenge a
decision of the Commission withdrawing funding for a project
without informing the beneficiary. 9 The Court explained that
the possibility for subnational actors to challenge community
acts is so subversive as to potentially undermine the entire EU
architecture.
Ironically, legal standing is generally conceived as a way to
increase democracy, pluralism, and decentralization, and the
Committee of the Regions has long advocated that regions with
legislative powers be able to bring a suit against those
4
Community acts that impinge on their regulatory ability. 1
Scholars have written in favor of expanding locus standi to local
governments to ensure better involvement of the regions and to
38. See TFEU, supra note 4. art. 263, 2010 OJ. C 83, at 162 (stating that the (J EU
only has "jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the European Parliament,
the Council, or the Commission"); see also Regione Siciliaa, [2006] E.C.R. 1-3881;
Nederlandse Anillen v. Council. Case C-452/98, [2001] E.C.R. 1-8973; Region
Wallonne v. Commission, Case C-95/97, [1997] E.C.R. 1-1787.
39. See Regione Toscana, [1997] E.C.R. 1-5245. [ 6 (holding that:
[lit is clear from the general scheme of the Treaties that the term Member
State, for the purposes of the institutional provisions and, in particular, those
relating to proceedings betore the courts, refers only to government
authorities of the Member States of the European (ominunities and cannot
include the governments of regions or of autonomous communities,
irrespective of the powers they may have. If the contrary were true, it would
undermine the institutional balance provided for by the Treaties. which
determine the conditions under which the Member States, that is to say the
States party to the Treaties establishing the Cominmunities and the Accession
Treaties, participate in the functioning of the Community institutions. It is
not possible for the European Communities to comprise a greater number of
Member States than the number of States between which they were
established.).
40. See Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Treaty Establishing a
(onstittion tor Europe, 2005 O.J. C 71/1. J[ 1.28: see also Koen Lenaerts, Access of
Regions with Legislative Powers to the European (ourt of Justice 1 (unpublished
manuscript) (delivered at the REGLE(E Conference in Brussels, Belgium, Mai 20,
2008). As to different conceptions of pluralism in constitutional litigation, see David
Feldinan, Public Interest Litigation and Constitutional Theomy in Comparative Perspective, 55
Mor. L. RrV. 44 (1992).
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give greater voice to subnational actors within the European
41
judicial process.
According to Stephen Weatherill, the lack of local
representation before the courts is problematic because it
reinforces centralization by strengthening the role of the states
as gatekeepers of the relationship between the regions and
Brussels while simultaneously excluding regional participation
in the judicial process. 42 Scholars have addressed the question of
locus standi in their effort to reconceptualize the role of the
judiciary in the new governance project.43 Through an analysis
of the case law of the CJEU, Joanne Scott and Susan Sturm
concluded that judicial review would allow courts to play a
44
catalytic role by enhancing participation in governance.
According to these authors, opening thejudiciary to local bodies
will generate new information for the implementation of EU
policies among participants that will democratically organize
their participation in new governance processes. 45 Daniela
Caruso has made a plea for locus standi for peripheral regions in
the realm of cohesion policy, particularly with respect to
southern Italian regions, which are traditionally underdeveloped
relative to the rest of Italy and Europe. 46 In her view, such a

41. For instance, Stephen Weatherill denounced the fact that regions have "no
direct access to the [European Community] law-making processes, and, moreover, that
they have little opportunity to challenge the validity of acts before the European
Cominunitys judicature, where they have no better standing under Article 23(0 than a
private indridual." THE ROLE OF REGIONS AN)

(Stephen Weatherill & Ulf Bernitz
42. See id.at 6: see also Piet
Decentralized Authorities BefJore
the
(2001).
43. SeeJoanne Scott & Susan

SUB-NATIONAIACTORS IN EUROPE 5

eds., 2005).
Van Nufil, WT]lat's in a Member State? Central and
Commurnity Courts, 38 (OMMON MKT. L. REV. 871
Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thikig thejudicial Role

in New Governrance, 13 COUiM.j. ELR.IL 565, 575 (2007).

44. Id.at 575-76. Courts, according to Joanne Scott and Susan Sturm, also
increase information in decision making and ensure "principled decision-making
through transparency and accountability." Id.at 575.
45. See id.at 576 ("Courts as catalysts can hold new governance institutions
accountable for providing adequate participation, based upon the criteria specified or
implicit within the new governance iramework.").
46. See Daniela Caruso. Direct Concern in Regional Policy: The European Court of
J-stice and the Southern Question, 17 EUR. L.J. 804 823-23 (2011) (addressing in
particular the relation between Brussels and southern Italy, and stating that " [ t]he fact
that the day-to-day lift of structural funds is something the E( tends not to talk about,
by holding firmly the reins of standing, has important repercussions beyond tlhe

technical sphere of regional policy. Judicial silence, in a court-centred discipline,
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procedural remedy would not only allow regions to bring
regional policy cases before the courts but also enable EU
lawyers to grapple with redistributive and development
problems.4
Despite these calls to expand the standing of local
governments before the European Courts, 4 judges have denied
standing to subnational entities. 49 At the moment, local
governments are not privileged applicants5°I because this would
open up the possibility for the European Courts to decide cases
in which a region or a city could challenge its central
government. 5 1 Thus, allowing a city to sue the state, which also
provides the source of its authority, would trigger a paradoxical
5
situation that the European Courts are careful to avoid. 2
confirms the impression of legal scholars that cohesion

policy

may be crucial to

political science or macroeconomics but hardly qualifies as law").

47. See id.
48. See Koen Lenaerts & Nathan Cambien, Regions and the European Court: Giving
Shape to the Regional Dimension of the A\lember States. 35 Eu R. I . REV. 609, 609 (2010)
(arguing that the EU treaties recognize the regional dimension of subnational entities,
explicitly citing Article 4(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:
"The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as
their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and
constitutional, inlCusive oJregional and ltoal sf-guvernmer t." (emphasis added)).
49. See Caruso, supra note 46, at 810. The Court of First Instance was more
generous in finding the admissibility of the regions to challenge the Commission
withdrawal of the regional funds, but its decisions wvere quickly overturned by the
European court. See id.

50. TFEU, supar note 4. art. 263, 2010 OJ.C 83, at 162.
51. See id.art. 263, at 162-63 (limiting CjEU jurisdiction to Member States, the
European Parliament. the Council of the European Union. and the Commission,while
giving quasi-privileged standing to the European Central Bank. the Economic and
Social Council, and the Committee of the Regions). For lurther support of this thesis,
see generally Van Nuffel, supaanote 42.
52. in the United States, courts have generally denied such possibility for exactly
the same reason. See, e.g.,
Williams v.Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36,
40 (1933) ("A municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of
government, has no privileges or immunities under the Federal Constitution which it
may invoke in opposition to the will of its
creator."); Hatley v.City of Charlotte, 826 F.
Supp. 2d 890. 902 (W.D.N.C.2011) ("A city's
violation of its own charter does not
amount to a cause of action under state law ....");Barrios-Barrios v. Clipps, 825 F.
Supp. 2d 730, 740 n.5 (E.I). la.2011) ("[U] nder Louisiana law, a police department is
not a juridical entity capable of being sued."); Branson v. Newburgh Police Dep't, 3:09CV-00154-RLY-WGH, 2011 WL 2845589, at *3 (S.D. Ind. July 18, 2011) ("Under
Indiana law, a municipal police department is neither established as a separate legal
entity nor granted the capacity to sue or be sued."); Bonillas v.Harlandale Indep. Sch.
Dist., No. SA-10-CV1053-XR, 2011 WL 2173620. at 3 (W.D.Tex. June 2, 2011)
("Governmental immunity is distinct from sovereign immunity. While sovereign
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This procedural aspect of the invisibility of cities is
consistent with the substantive aspect that EU law should not, in
principle, intervene directly in state-local matters.
B. Bevond the Fiction of Nonintervention in State-Local AMatters
Through the fiction of nonintervention in state-local
matters, judges have portrayed EU law as having no impact on
the redistribution of power and resources between the Member
States and their subnational actors." Member States can
structure their relationship with subnational actors as they wish,
completely autonomous from EU law. Local actors, in turn, are
shielded from the effects of EU law. 54 Despite these assumptions,
the CJEU has occasionally departed from the fiction of
nonintervention. As this Section explains, in "wholly internal"
situations in which domestic legislation creates reverse
discrimination among a Member State's citizens, the CJEU has
evaluated the impact of EU law on different local communities
in order to clarify7 which cases might be outside the scope of EU
law. In some of these cases, judges have had to consider the
economic and political tensions arising from the national
legislative scheme to understand its effects on different local
communities.
This Section further explains that the ideological structure
of arguments that judges use in interpreting internal market
rules leaves little room for policy arguments about local

immunity protects the state and its divisions from suit and liability, governmental
immunitv extends to political subdivisions such as counties, cities, and school districts."
(Citations onittcd)); Henry-Lee v. City of New York, 746 . Supp. 2d 546, 559 n.l
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("Under New ik law... 'a department of a municipal entity is
merely a subdivision of the municipality and has no separate legal existence.'" (quoting
Hoisington v. Cray. of Sullivan, 55 F. Supp. 2d 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1999))).
53. See Fernanda Nicola, The False Promise of Decentralizationin EU Cohesion Policy,
20 TU I J. INT'l & COMP. I. 65 (2011)

(demonstrating that even EU cohesion and

regional policies tostcr renationalization and stronger ties between Brussels and the
Member States rather than decentralization of power).
54. Likewise, the US Supreme Court has interpreted federal constitutional law so
as not to impose any limitation on how states allocate or restrict the power of local
governments. See id. (explaining that neither federalism in the United States nor
subsidiarity in the European Union have "done much to resolve the basic problem that
the complexity of the concept of local autonomy poses: there is no clean way to divide
matters into discrete 'local' and 'central' spheres.... In fact. both concepts have been
used tojustify denying power to localities").
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interests. These are either conflated with Member States'
interests or reduced to the interests of private market actors. In
foregrounding the tacit existence of a "third level ' 55 Europe,
this Essay enriches our understanding of the stakes in judicial
preferences, which are often reduced in policy arguments to
5
pro-Europe versus pro-Member States. 6
1. Reverse Discrimination for Which Communities?
While the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon and numerous directives
and case law have strengthened the rights of European citizens,
the "wholly internal" situation doctrine has become an
important shield to protect Member States from the expansion
of EU powers. This doctrine allows Member States to maintain
reverse discriminatory schemes because they have no nexus to
EU law. Member States can insulate a territory or a community
of people residing in a particular place by treating them
differently from others located in the same state.
Recent case law on EU citizenship has granted immigrant
status to non-EU-nationals by partially limiting the extent of the
wholly internal situation doctrine is Avis European citizens. 57 In
line with this development, scholars have argued that the wholly
internal situation doctrine is a specter of the past and therefore
5
a truly integrated union should move beyond it. 8
55. See THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARD A THIRD
LEVEL IN EUROPeL (Charlie Jceffry ed, 1997)

56. See R. Daniel Kelemen, The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in
the European Union (Aug. 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (paper prepared tor
presentation at the European Union Studies Association Biennial Convention, Boston,
Massachusetts, March 3-5, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.con /sol3/papers.ciin?
abstract id-1914516 (exploring the political foundations of.judicial independence in
the European Union and to what degree is the E(J remains insulated against court
curbing mechanisms that might otherwise threaten judicial independence) .
57. See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Zamibrano v. Office Nat'l de
l'Einploi, Case C-34/09. [2011] E.C.R. I
, 191-102 (delivered Sept. 30, 2010) (not
yet reported) (linding that Belgium violated EU law with respect to applicants
citizenship over Belgium's objections that the applicant's situation was "purely
internal"); see also Zambrano, [2011] E.C.R. I
(Mar. 8, 2011) (not yet reported).
Contra McCarthy v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C-434/09, [2011] E.(.R.
I
, t 41 (delivered May 5, 2011) (not yet reported); Uccker & Jacquet v. Land
Nordrhein-Westtalen, Joined Cases C-64-65/96, [1997] F.C.R. 1-3171,
16 (holding
that citizenship rights do not arise in the wholly internal situation).
58. See Shuibhne, supra note 9, at 733; see also McCarthy,, [2011] E.(.R. 1
, 42:
Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Gov't of the French Crnt. & Walloon Gov'tv.
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Although there are still issues that do not have any crossborder implications, in recent years increasing EU regulatory
power and the sanctioning of discriminatory behavior by the
European Courts have resulted in reducing considerably the
amount of purely internal issues. 59 An expression of this trend

can be found in Alina Try4ondou's argument that:
Since reverse discrimination arises as a result of the process
of constructing an internal market and the limited scope of
application of EU law, it should now be considered a
difference in treatment that falls within the general scope of
EU law, as it impedes the Community's now all-important
aim of ensuring that no discrimination arises as a result of
the process of European integration.6o
Despite this important trend in legal scholarship, today
Member States often successfully rely on the wholly internal
situation doctrine to show that their policy is not discriminatory
because it only discriminates in domestic situations, a right
afforded where there is no link with EU law. In this sense, the
wholly internal situation doctrine has a strong "states rights"
bent, strengthening a federalist or a Euro-skeptic position.61 In
contrast, those who favor federal powers, or Europhiles, have
argued that links with EU law can be found in every domestic
scenario, often in connection with the expanding notion of
European citizenship.62
Reverse discrimination cases with a territorial dimension
have sometimes obliged judges to unpack the effects of domestic
legislation on different local communities. Because Member
States can allow redistributive schemes that favor only a specific
group of residents rather than the entire population, localities
Flemish Gov't, Case C-2 12/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-1683, I-1687, 11 39-40; UTeck, [1997]
E.C.R. 1-3171, [23.
59. See Shuibhne, supra note ),at 741-62 (describing the gradual erosion of
purely internal market issues by the (JEU); see also Opinion of Advocate, General
Mischo, Nederlandse Bakkcrij Sichting & Others v. Edah, Joined Cases 80/85 &
159/85. [1986] E.C.R. 3359, 3369. [ 20-21 (holding that a rue internal market "inust
of necessity be based on the principle of equal treatment").
60. See Tryfonidou, supra note 9, at 63-64.
61. See Ernest Young, Protecting M4ember State Autonomy in the European Union: Some
Cautionary Tale yfr Anericu Federa sil, 77 N..I
R1 .'162 (2002).
62. See geeralhy Alina Tryfonidou. Pure/y Interval Situations and Reverse
Discrimnation in a Citizens' Europe: Time to 'everse" Reverse Discrimnation?. in ISSUES IN
SOCIAL Po0,IY: A NFW AGENDA I I (Peter G. Xuereb ed, 2009).
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are often at the center of cases involving the wholly internal
situation doctrine. For example, in Government of the French
Community & Walloon Government v. Flemish Community,': the
French Community in Belgium challenged an insurance scheme
adopted by the Flemish government that was open only to
individuals who both lived and worked in the Flanders region
4
and not to those working in Flanders but residing in Wallonia.6
Within this politically charged context, Belgium's national
court referred a preliminary question to the CJEU to address the
issue of whether the scheme contravened the EU principle of
nondiscrimination or whether it fell within a wholly internal
situation outside the scope of EU law. The Government of the
French Community argued that the requirement of residency
for entitlement to the insurance scheme amounted to a
restrictive measure that infringed on provisions of Community
law concerning freedom of movement of persons and, as such,
this was a matter of EU law. In contrast, the Flemish
government, the legislator of the care insurance scheme, argued
that the matter had no link with EU law since it was a purely
internal situation.
The Court did not fully agree with either argument but
instead unpacked the effect of the insurance scheme vis a Nis
different groups. It distinguished between two categories of
workers impacted differently by the scheme. First, the Court
addressed those "Belgian nationals working in the territory of
the Dutch-speaking region or in that of the bilingual region of
the Brussels-Capital but who live in the French- or Germanspeaking region and have never exercised their freedom to
move within the European Community. ' 6 The Court held that
for these workers, "[c]ommunity law clearly cannot be applied

63. Gov't oftheFrench CtY.. [2008] E.C.R. 1-1683.
64. See id.1[ 12-13. The motivation behind this insurance scheme reflects the
internal division that permcates Belgium and the ethnic and linguistic divisions
between the three major language groups: Dutch (Flemish), French (Wallons), and
German speakers. Belgium's Walloons and Flemish, characterized by cultural
difierences as well economic disparities, often engage in political stalcmates at the
national level, resulting in Belgium's government often being a "near-ungovernable
federation" because of its internal rivalries. See The Trouble with Flanders: Why Belgium's
LUendingLinguisticDisputes Matter to Europe, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2011. at 51.
65. Gov't oftheFrench CrntY.. [2008] E.C.R. 1-1683, 1[[ 12-13.
66. Id. 37
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to such purely internal situations."6

7

For a second category of

workers,
[B]oth nationals of Member States other than the Kingdom
of Belgium working in the Dutch-speaking region or in the
bilingual region of Brussels-Capital but who live in another
part of the national territory, and Belgian nationals in the
same situation who have made use of their right to freedom
of movement
8
the Court held that EU law precluded the Flemish scheme.6
This split between these two categories of workers showed the
paradoxical outcome that EU (non-Belgian) citizens residing in
Belgium were better protected than other Belgian citizens who
moved because EU law offered more protection than Belgian
law. Rather than completely abandoning the wholly internal
situation doctrine, the Court ventured a careful analysis of which
groups could be protected under EU law according to whether
they had taken advantage of their ability to move.
This unusual outcome has been decried by scholars who
dislike the fact that Member States may legally discriminate
against their citizens who have never worked outside that state,
so long as the discrimination is done locally as part of the
Member State's internal policy. 9 In her opinion in the case,
Advocate General ("AG") Sharpston mocked this outcome:
I must confess to finding something deeply paradoxical
about the proposition that, although the last 50 years have
been spent abolishing barriers to freedom of movement
between Member States, decentralised authorities of Member
States may nevertheless reintroduce barriers through the
back door by establishing them within Member States. One
might ask rhetorically, what sort of a European Union is it if
freedom of movement is guaranteed between Dunkirk
(France) and De Panne (Belgium), but not between
70
Jodoigne and Hoegaarden?

67. Id. 38.
68. Id.
41-42, 60.
69. See Piet Eeckhout, The Growing Influence of European Union Law. 33 FORDH M
INT'I I. j. 1490, 1495-96 (2010); see also A1INA TRYTONIDOU, REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
IN E( LAW 43-44 (2009).
70. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpst[on, Gov't of the French Ct'Y.. [20081
E.C.R. at 1-1687, 1 116.
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Sharpston's description of the paradoxical situation of
allowing localities but not Member States to discriminate among
their residents is a powerful reason to set aside the wholly
internal situation doctrine and an explicit reference to the
discriminatory taxation opinion by AG Tesauro: "[B]arriers to
trade between Portugal and Denmark are prohibited, whilst
barriers to trade between Naples and Capri are immaterial."1
Sharpston relies on the antidiscrimination principle in the
TFEU, 72 as strengthened by the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, 73 to argue that "[d]iscrimination is thus generally
perceived to be repugnant and something that should be
prohibited." 74 Her analysis, however, goes further to unpack the
effects of the Belgian insurance scheme. In doing so, she follows
AG Poiares Maduro's opinion in Carbonati Apuani75 where he
used the Community objective of nondiscrimination to set aside
7
the wholly internal situation doctrine. 6
In Carbonati Apuani, an Italian municipality tried to
characterize a local taxation on export as having a wholly
internal impact so that it would not be deemed in conflict with
the TFEU-based prohibition of customs duties on exports and
charges having equivalent effect. 77 The CJEU held that the local
taxation scheme was incompatible with Article 30 of the TFEU
despite the well-founded argument that the city tax revenue was
"intended to cover the expenses borne by the Comune di
Carrara as a consequence of the marble industry's activities in its
territory. "7' , In relying on the AGs opinion, the Court held that
71. Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, Laner) & Others v. Direction Gncrale
des Douanes & Others, Joined Cases C-363, 407-411/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-3957, 1-3960,
28.
72. TFEU, supra note 4. art. 18. 2010 OJ. C 83, at 56.
73. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 21, 2010 O.J C
83/389. at 396 [hereinafter Charter of Rights].
74. Opinion of Adwocate (kneral Sharpston, Gov't of the French Ct'Y.. [2008]
E.C.R. at |-1687, 1 147.
75. See Carbonati Apuani Srl v. Comune di Carrara, Case C-72/03. [2004] E.( R. 18027.
76. See Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, CarbonatiApuani, [2004] E.C.R. at
1-8029, 1[ 63 ("I take the view that it is now clearly one of the fundamental objectives of
the Community to ensure that no discrinination of any kind should arise as a result of
the application of its own rules. ").
77. See CarbonatiApuani, [2004] E.C.R. 1-8027. [[ 7-8; TFEU, supra note 4. art. 30,
2010 OJ. C 83, at 60.
78. Carbonat,Apai,, [2004] E.C.R. 1-8027, 1330, 42.
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the costs sought by the municipality were not only to the benefit
of the economic operators who transported the marble but that
they had a broader general redistributive scope among the
79
community.
Even though in this case the city could not apply for an
exemption because its tax scheme was equivalent to a custom
duty prohibited by the TFEU, Maduro suggested that it should
be left to the national court to balance the costs that the tax
scheme created for the different groups that were benefitting
from, or penalized by, the export tax.s° When balancing
conflicting interests requires a deeper contextual knowledge,
the CJEU has often deferred this proportionality decision to
domestic courts. As Grdinne de Btirca explains, "the interest
affected is seen as a collective or general public interest rather
than an individual right and ...

the interest of the State is a

mixed and complex one."' 8 Likewise, in addressing wholly
internal situation doctrine, Maduro has advocated that national
courts should "review cases of reverse discrimination. "2 As these
authors suggest, the impact of the local regulation at stake might
require more information and closer scrutiny to figure out what
kind of communities will be impacted by EU law.
If deferring the final balancing to domestic courts has been
one possible avenue to take local stakes seriously, another
avenue is to have European courts balancing the plurality of
conflicting interests especially in those situations where the
legislation at stake has simultaneously a local, national, and
transnational impact. For instance, Maduro has stated that:
Apart from policies protecting their own nationals to the
disadvantage of other nationals. however, policy-making is
still seen as internal matter for each State ....

[I]t is

debatable if that is still the case in the European Union and
whether Member States regulatox powers should not be

79. See id. 32.
80. See Opinion of Adwocatt General Maduro, Carbonati Apuani. [2004] E.C.R. I8029, 36 ("It will be for the national court to determine whether those conditions
have been satisfied in the circumstances of this case.").
81. Grainne de Burca, The Principle of Proportionalityand its Application in EC Law,
13 Y.B. EIR. L. 105 (1993).
82. See Miguel Poiarcs Maduro, The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of Purie
Internal Situations and Reverse Discrimination, in THE FUTURE or REMEDIES IN EUROPE
117, 118 (Claire Kilpatrick et al. eds., 2000).
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seen as strictly interdependent and subject to participation

by a larger political community (that, of all those affected by
the State regulation within the single European market) .3
In addressing Maduro's challenge, this Essay suggests that
understanding the reasons both in favor and against reverse
discrimination as articulated by local communities will allow
European judges to have a better distributive assessment of the
implication of discriminatory provisions on local and
transnational communities. When European judges are called
upon to strike down reverse discriminatory schemes they have
the opportunity to decide a socially explosive matter that will
likely have an impact in state-local relations. In her opinion in
the Government of the French Community case, Sharpston does not

shy away from such a challenge and ultimately is willing to
openly evaluate territorial regulatory schemes by the Member
States, and their local governments. She explains that a
discriminatory scheme might discriminate per se or it might
seek to promote development in underdeveloped territories
through
subsidies
targeted
towards
less
advantaged
communities.8 4 In either case, European judges are well-situated
to understand the effects of the domestic regulatory scheme on
different local or transnational communities and to decide or
remand the decision to domestic courts.

83. See MIGUEl POLARES MADURO, WE THE (COURT:THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION; A (RITICAI. READING OF
ARTICLE 30 OF THE EC TREATY 148 (1998).
84. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Gov't of the French Cmty.& Walloon
Gov't v. Flemish Gov't, Case C-212/06. [2008] E.C.R. 1-1683, 1-1687, 155 ("Any
discrimination against that group would, of course, be indirect rather than direct. For
that reason, it would be open to Member States to raise arguments of objective
justification. It is not difficult to foresee circumstances in which such objective
justification could potentially be made out. One can readily imagine (for example)
that, in order to promote a less-developed region within itsterritory, or to deal with a
problem that is endemic to one region but does not aftc the rest of itsterritor , a
Member State might wish to make certain advantages available only to those living
within a particular region. Wellounded objective justification would leave Member
States ample scope to apply differentiated rules in Situations that, objectively, merited
such

treatment,

whilst

safeguarding

Citizens of

discrimination that could not be so justified.").

tLhe Union

against

arbiUary
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2. Policy Arguments in Internal Market Adjudication
This Section analyzes the different policy arguments that

European judges use in interpreting the provisions regulating
the internal market. Judges have used policy arguments to justify
the triangular relationship between the European Union and
the Member States as two independent spheres of authority on
the one hand, and the European Union and its citizens to show
that these are bestowed with EU law rights independently from
their states, on the other. Each argument reflects a different
normative theory that judges have used to interpret the
provisions of the internal market. These policy arguments
address national welfare, public policy, regulatory competition,
and citizens' rights in the internal market through a mix of
85
state/individual and private/public arguments.
This Essay shows that policy arguments in European
adjudication have stifled the way in which lawyers think about
the social and democratic relevance of local policies because
they have reduced any divergence to two conflicting spheres of
autonomous and independent power: the European Union
versus the Member States. Cities are reduced to invisible actors
because judges have characterized them either as public actors
as long as they are mere subdivisions of the state, or as private
actors who are mere market participants. In doing so, judges
have collapsed the numerous local with a single national
position in a way that hides the internal conflicts among state
constituencies over the adoption of a national policy.
Alternatively, cities remain private actors in the internal market
so long as they have no governmental functions. In this way,
cities are equal to private corporations that do not receive the
benefit of the several public exceptions in competition law.86

85. For a semiotics of policy arguments in adjudication, see Jack Balkin, The
Cystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RLT(,LRS L. RDV. 1, 20-36 (1986) (categorizing
and describing the most common recurring arguments, which theoretically
recapitulate thc dialectic of individualism and coimmunalism"); Duncan Kcnned y,A
Se iotics of Legal Argument. 42 SYRACUSL L. RV.75, 77-80 (1991) (illustrating the
maxim and countermaxir" structure of legal argument and focusing, in particular,
on policy argumnents ofe;n deployed in adjudication).
86. See Frug, supra notC 3, at 1127-28; see also GERALD E.FRUG & DAVD.J. BARRON,
(ITY BOUND: How STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 43-46 (2008).
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To reproduce this battle of competing interests between
the European Union and its Member States, judges have used
four different arguments in order to mediate sovereignty and
welfare tensions emerging in the internal market. I have called
these arguments "national welfare," "public policy," "regulatory
competition," and "rights of EU citizens."8 7 The first two
arguments on "national welfare" and "public policy" help
judges to limit market liberalization and uphold Member State
welfare measures restricting the free movement of goods,
workers, and services. Through these arguments, the courts have
created some important exceptions to their free movement
jurisprudence and competition law rules., In contrast, judges
have used a second set of arguments on "regulatory
competition" and "rights of EU citizens" to strike down those
national measures limiting the free movement of goods,
workers, services, and EU citizens, all of which hold the right to
move freely in the internal market without being discriminated
against on the basis of their nationality.
Both sets of arguments have limited the balancing of the
proportionality approach of the Court to an assessment of the
burden created on the EU free trade regime by protectionist
Member State measures.8 9 Often the European Courts refer the
proportionality test to domestic courts because these cases are
embedded in moral, social, and religious values that they are illsuited to deal with."° This approach has secured a strong form of
constitutional pluralism in European adjudication, :1 even
though critics have pointed out that the legal analysis that the

87. See infra Table I.
88. See Toriaen Borough Council v. B & Q Plc (Sunday Trading), Case G-145/88,
[1989] E.C.R. 3851. [12.
89. Compare TFEU, supra note 3, art. 34, 2010 O.J. C 83. at 61. with id.art. 36, at
61.

90. See Rewve-Zentral A.G. v Bundesmonopolveiwaltunghir Brannnwein (Cassis),
Case 120/78. [1979] E.C.R. 649. Cassis is the landmark decision concerning thre free
movement of goods. In interpreting Article 28 of the Treaty Establishing the Economic
Community ("EC Treaty"), which regulates the friee
movement of goods, the ( JEU
asserted itscompetence to assess the intrinsic reasonableness of all national health,
safety, or environmental product regulations that could have a negative impact on
cross-border trade. Id.
91. See geFerally Fancesca Bignamii, The Case for Tolerant Constitutional Patriotsm:
The Rigld toPrvacy BeJre theEtropean Courts, 41 CORNELL INT'I U.J.
211 (2008).
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CJEU offers to the domestic courts leaves little room to
2
maneuver to localjudges.9
Through these policy arguments, European adjudication
has overlooked the powers of cities or those intermediate
associations whose welfare policies depart from national ones or
cannot be reduced to mere private activities. The four types of
policy arguments that judges have used to interpret internal
market provisions have made cities invisible to a new legal order
where the main actors are the European Union, the Member
States, and eventually their citizens.
Judges have interpreted "national welfare" arguments to
limit free movement and favor national legislation in free
movement of goods cases. The (4EU has referred to national
welfare to uphold those national policies that would otherwise
have been struck down because they were incompatible with
Article 34 of the TFEU.9- However, judges have used these
national welfare arguments to justify national, rather than local,
diversity against the deregulatory pressure of the four freedoms
in the internal market.
National welfare arguments find a source of legitimacy in
Fritz Scharpf's notion that the internal market triggers social
dumping because of the constitutional asymmetry intrinsic in
92. See generally Konsumentombudsmannen v. Gourmet Int'l Prods. AB (The
Gourmet Case), Case C-405/98. [2001] E.C.R. 1-1816. See Ulf Djurberg, The Gourmet
Case: A Revolution in the "CuisineSuedoise" and a Major Development ofEU Case Law2 , EUR.
LAW., Apr.2003, which shows the inflexibility aflorded to domestic courts where a local
Swedish court was forced to strike down a ban on alcohol advertising to remain in
accordance with the (JEU's reasoning.
93. See TFEU, supra note 4, art. 36, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 61 (providing a list of
exceptions to the quantitative restrictions to trade torbidden by Ai ticle 34); see also The
Gourmet Case. [2001] E.C.R. 1-1816: Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent v. B & Q Pit.
Case C-169/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-6635, 1 11 (holding that "national rules restricting the
opening of shops on Sundays reflected certain choices relating to particular national or
regional socio-econoinic characteristics"); Quictlynn Ltd. v. Southend Borough
Council, Case C-23/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3059, 9 (holding that national legislation
limiting the sale of sex articles to licensed stores only isa rule "merely ...regarding
[sex article] distribution" isnot caught by Article 34 of the Treay on the Functioning
of the European Union ("TFEU")); Sunday Trading, [1989] E.C.R. 3851; Cassis, [1979]
E.C.R. 649. Compare Summary Proceedings Against Sergius Oebel. Case 155/80, [1981]
E.C.R. 1993 (holding that a measure prohibiting bread delivery to retailers at night
does not discriminate among producers and is a legitimate socioeconomic policy), with
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For a comparison between the two, see
Danicla Caruso, Lochner in Europe: A Comment on Keith Whittingtons "Congress Before the
Lochner Court, "85 B.U. I.REV. 867 (2005).
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4

This asymmet - lies in the structure of tie European
Union, which, by contrast with its Member States, prioritizes free
market goals over social welfare goals. - 5 Thus, European
integration creates an opposition between the EU level,
intrinsically connected to economic regulation, and the Member
State level, intrinsically connected to welfare policies. The
construction of rigid dichotomies between Europe and its
Member States legitimizes the Court's role as an umpire without
blurring the distinction between law and politics.
The problem with national welfare arguments, however, is
that the fear of social dumping is based on public/state
arguments that only consider the states rather than the more
complex internal dynamics that might show strong opposition to
welfarist legislation even by some local governments. Thus, city
policies are upheld by the CJEU as justified state policies as long
9
as they do not depart from national welfare policies. 6
The CJEU has used a "public policy" argument to uphold
national legislation that defends values explicitly recognized by
the different constitutional regimes, against the pressure of the
internal market. This argument performs a similar function to
the "national welfare" argument insofar as it creates a limit to
free movement in the internal market. Judges have interpreted
public policy arguments, however, to uphold national legislation

94. Social dumping isa strategy promoted only at the EU level rather than at the
national one, whereby you can replace a serwice or an employee with a cheaper one
from another Member State. See Flora Lewis, Europe's Social Dumping. N.Y.TIMES, July
24, 1993, at 19; see also )arnjan Kukovec, A Critique of the Rhetoric of Common
Interest in the European Union Legal Discourse 4 (May 25, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Institute for Global Law & Policy),
available at http:i / wwiw.harv ardiglp.org/wp-content/ uploads /-critique-o f-the-rhetoricof comimon-intelcrstMayl 7.pdt.
95. See Fritz Scharp The Eurapean Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversih,, 40
COMMON MKT. SiTUD. 645 (2002).
96. A striking example is the protection of labor. In many ( JEU cases, associations
such as unions are considered to be communities of workers protecting the individual
interests of a specific and limited group of workers rather than national public
interests. See Dirk Riffeirt v. Land Niedersachsen (Riiffect), Case C-346/06. [2008]
E.C.R. 1-1989 (providing that the Land's policy vis vispublic workers is one of the
most protective of labor than in the rest of (ermany); Opinion of Advocate General
Van Gerven, MWerci. Case C-179/90. [1991] E.C.R. 1-5889, 1-5905 (unionized labor in the
Genova harbor
d
rflt creates sUong protections tor dock workers in that municipality is
likely to create a restriction of competition).
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through a balancing test that is often carried out by domestic
courts.

97

When European judges have balanced national legislation
on free movement rules, they have done so in conjunction with
rights or values protected by constitutional regimes. In these
cases, the CJEU has used public policy arguments to balance, for
instance, state discriminatory practices arising in the case of free
movement of workers. By strengthening the free movement of
workers, the Court upheld forms of indirect discrimination by
public and private institutions that did not hire workers on the
basis of nationality.98 The CJEU has, however, interpreted the
free movement provisions as creating an exemption to the free
movement of services by upholding individual rights or domestic
99
values when protected under national constitutional regimes.
The theory of constitutional patriotism provides legitimacy
to public policy arguments. This theory reconciles internal
market freedoms with a pluralist constitutional regime that
protects diverse national and cultural values. °° Through these
policy arguments, however, pluralist values prevail over free
movement only as far as they are formally recognized by
national constitutions. Thus, European courts will uphold local
measures against free movement only when city policies are
97. See, e.g., Skatteverket v. Gourmet Classic Ltd., C-458/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-4207;
Konsuicntombudsmanncn v. Gourmet Int'l Prods. AB, Case C-405/98, [20(01] E.C.R.
1-1816.
98. See Anita Groener v. Minister for Educ., Case C-379/87, [1989] E.C.R. 1-3967
(upholding the Irish Minister for Education's decision to deny a permanent art teacher
position to a national of the Netherlands upon her failure to pass an Irish language
skills test).
99. See Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n v. Viking Line ABP (kViig), Case C-438/05,
[2007] E.C.R. 1-10779, [ 46 ("[T]he exercise of the fundamental rights at issue, that is,
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and respect for human dignity,
respectively, does not tall outside the scope of the provisions of thre Treaty and
considered that such exercise must be reconciled with the requirements relating to
rights protected under the Treaty and in accordance wvith the principle of
proportionality .... "); Onega Spielhallen-und Attomnatenaufstcllungs-(;mbH
v.
Oberbfirgermeisterin de Bundesstadt Bonn. Case C-36/02. [2004] E.C.R. 1-9609,
12, 36; Eugen Schmidberger v. Republik Osterreich, Case C-I 12/00, [2003] E.C.R.
1-5659 (finding that the public interests involved in an environmental demonstration,
which prohibited the fiee moveuent of goods, should be weighed against the
prohibition of the free movement of goods).
100. See Bignauni, supra note 91; see also Jrgen Habertnas, VW7]Europe Needs a
Constitution, NLW LLFT RL\V., Sep[.-Oct. 2001;.Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Transjbrmation of
Europe, 100 YiE L.J. 2403 (1991).
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consistent with rights and values protected under the Member
States' constitution or EU law. If local stakes or collective
bargaining policies clash with national laws, such stakes are not
upheld byjudges as justifiable limitations on the four freedoms.
European judges have used "regulatory competition"
arguments in order to create more efficiency and mobility in the
internal market by rewarding those Member States with lower
protections for consumers and investors. 101 Judges have upheld
free movement based on an efficiency rationale, while striking
down protectionist state measures that overall created barriers to
trade. An example is the well-known labor union saga in which
the CJEU has increased the fear of social dumping at least Nis a
vis free movement of workers and companies exploiting cheap
wage labor coming from former Eastern European countries. In
these cases, the Court has upheld free movement against
national collective bargaining agreements in order to promote
2
regulatory competition in the European Union.11
European scholars have used regulatory competition
arguments to advocate for less harmonization in the internal
market and more competition among legal regimes. 0 3 In its free
movement of services and establishment jurisprudence, the
CJEU has voided national legislation that restricted the mobility
of companies and the possibility to provide services freely in the

101. See Centros Ltd. V. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, Case C-212/97, [1999]
E.C.R. 1484 (holding that a Board's refusal "to register a branch of a company formed
in accordance with the law of another Member State" ispreventative of "any exercise of
the right freely to set up a seconda) establishment which Articles 52 and 68 [of the
TFEU] are specifically intended to guarantee" and thus limiting the free movement of
establishment affecting the movement of corporations); see also Katner van Koophandel
en Fabrieken voor Amsterdan v. Inspire Art Ltd., Case C-167/01, [2003] E.C.R. I10195; Uberseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH
(NCC),Case C-208/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9943.
102. For a full description of the dispute, fore which the following draws, see
Charles Woolfson & Jeff Sommers, Labour Alobility in Construction: European Implications
of theLava an Partner Dispute with Swedish Labou. 12 EUR.J. INDUS. REI. 49 (2006).
103. See Roger Van den Bergh. Forced Harnionisationof Contract Law in Europe: Not
to Be Cotinued, ir kN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW/249
(Stefan Grundinann & Jules Stuck eds.. 2002); see also Fernanda G. Nicola,
Transatianticisms. Constittional As mmt), and Selective Reception of US. Law and
Ecoomics i the Formation ofJEopear Privae Law, 16 CARDOZOJ. INT'L & COMP. L.87
(2008) (mapping the schools of thought importing US law and economics in European
private law, entailing a shift from German economic ordo-li1)clibi
to US regulatol)
competition ideas).
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internal market 10 4 Such regulatory diversity has created
incentives to shop around for better legislation to incorporate
companies or provide more efficient services.
According
to
regulatory
competition
arguments,
deregulation creates a more efficient marketplace for services
and labor while also fostering competition among states." The
inaccuracy of these arguments is that they reduce the conflicts
on market deregulation to European versus state interests in a
false way. For instance, Dainjan Kukovec has shown that in the
labor deregulation saga, the Member States were split along a
West/East divide where former Eastern European states were
favorable to strike down labor and collective bargaining
protections in the West in order to have their low-wage workers
compete in European labor markets.1ub
Likewise, local interests cannot be reduced to state and
welfarist ones. At times, local actors are more favorable to
market deregulation and neoliberal policies than supranational
actors. 107 Therefore, regulatory competition arguments might
benefit some local agendas but simultaneously undermine
others. 118
The "rights of EU citizens" argument performs a similar
function to the regulatory competition argument insofar as it
has been used by judges to strike down discriminatory state or
local measures. Judges assert this argument to promote free
104. See Oberseering, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9943; Centros, [1999] E.C.R. 1-1484; see also
Criminal Proceedings Against Massimiliano Placanica. Christian Palazzese & Angelo
Sorricchio, Joined Cases C-338, C-359-60/04, [2007] E.C.R. 1-1891 (finding that the
Italian sports betting licensing regime wvas discriminatory and in breach of Articles 43
and 49 of the EC Treaty on the freedom of establishment and free provision of

services); Criminal Proceedings Against Piergiorgio Gamnbelli. Case C-243/01, [2003]
E.C.R. 1-13031.
105. See generally UGO MATTEI, COMPARATITE I AW ANT ECONOMICS (1997).

106. See Diamjan Kukovec, WVhose Social Europe?: The LavaliVikin Judgments and the
Prosperity Gap (Harvard ILaw Sch. Inst. for Global Law & Policy, Working Paper Series
No. 3. 2011), available at http:/ /wsw.harvardiglp.org/all-resoutrces/working-papers/
iglp-wo rking-paper-serie s-20113-whose-social-europe-thc-laval-judgment-and-theprosperi tN-gap-by-darnjan-kukovec-sjd-har-vard-law-schooli.
107. See James Thuo Gathii. The Neoliberal Tura in Reional Trade Agreenents, 86
WASH. L. RLV. 421 (2011).
108. For the local implication of their decisions, see the discussion of free
movement of setices and workers in the Rfiffert case. See Rfffert. Case C-346/06, [2008]
E.C.R. 1-1989. The R~ffert judgment has important national-local

Germany.

implications in
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movement of EU citizens in receiving public subsidies without
being discriminated against by national or local rules. The CJEU
has expanded the rights of European citizens by interpreting the
free movement of workers provision in the TFEU in conjunction
with the principle of antidiscrimination. °Today, EU citizens have the right to move freely across
Europe by increasingly enjoying social welfare provisions
granted by host states without being discriminated against on
the basis of their nationality. 1 The construction of EU
citizenship has entailed the dismantling of state or local
discriminatory practices with respect to equal access to
education, in a subject matter where the European Union has
only a complementary competence to intervene and no power
to harmonize legislation."' Over time, however, the CJEU has
intervened in several cases on tuition fees and the recognition of
diplomas that highlight the deep connection between vocational
training and higher education and the internal market. The
Court clarified that once students can access higher education
abroad, they become more competitive workers and as a
consequence they have greater potential for mobility in seeking
jobs all over the European Union.1 2 If initially scholars
welcomed this line of cases on EU citizenship that expand the
rights of free movement of students through the right of equal
access to education,1 ' others have addressed the distributive
109. See TFEU, supra note 4. arts. 19, 45, 2010 O,. C 83, at 56, 65-66: Council
Regulation No. 492/2011 on Freedom of Movement for Workers Within the
Community (codification), 2011 0,1. L 141; Directive 2004/38/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Right of Citizens of the Union and their Family
Members to Move and Reside Freely Within the Territory of the Member States, 2004
Oj. L 158/77, arts. 27-33, at 113-19 [hereinafter Directive on Citizens' Free
Movement and Residence Rights].
110. See Commission v.Austria, Case C-147/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5969; Regina Bidar
v.Ealing London Borough Council & Another. Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-2119;
Francoise Gravier v.City of Liigc, Case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R 593. For an ovelview of
education in EU law, see generally Josephine Shaw, Education a d the Law in the
European CornrnuniW, 21 J.L. & En C. 415 (1992).
111. TFEU, supra note 4, art. 165(4), 2010 0,1. C 83, at 120-21 (permitting "the
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure... [to] adopt incentive measures. excluding any harimonisation
of the laws and regulations of the Member States" after consultation with the Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions).
112. See Opinion of Adjoate GeneralJacobs, Austria [2005] E.C.R. at 1-5972.
113. See Francesca Strumia, Ctze ship and Free M4ovement: European and American
Features of a JdiialFornul1a
,
fin Ic- sed Comity, 12 Cot uM.J. FUR. I 713 (2006); seealso
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impact of these decisions on local or state welfare policies 1 4 as
well as the Member State resistance vis Lvis the CJEU attack on
1
national education discriminatory schemes. 15
The CJEU has promoted students' mobility as a basic right
of the market entailing the fact that states should abandon the
discriminatory practice denying education subsidies based on
nationality or residency requirements. Initially, the Court
promoted a version of consumer-citizens who can choose where
to live as long as there is an overall gain for the internal market.
While EU citizens could move freely with minimal residence
restrictions, state and local actors had to compete among each
other as best suppliers of public goods or education services to
attract European consumer-citizens.lb
Even though the CJEU adjudication in the realm of student
mobility has recently paid greater attention to Member States
arguments against dismantling discriminatory schemes such as
quota restrictions, 11 7 the Court has not yet differentiated
between state or local funding. Where local actors, rather than
national ones, participate through educational grants or
housing subsidies in supporting their residents' access to higher
education, the CJEU judgment favoring European students'
18
mobility might lead to the shrinking of local subsidies.' '
The current student saga has led to the incorrect
classification of the education conflict as one between the
European Union (committed to students' mobility) and the
Member States (discriminating against nonnationals to preserve
Siotia O'Lear), Equal Treatment of EU Citizens: A e Cipter on Cross-BorderEducational
Mobility andAccess to Sudent FnarciaAsss(nce, 34 FIT- 1. REV. 612 (2009).
114. See Eric Beerkens, The Emergence and lnstitutinalisatinof the European Higer
Education and Research Area, 43 EUR. .. EDUC. 407 (2008).
115. See Sacha (,arben, Tie BedgianAuslit
Education, Sag'a (Harvard European
Law Ass'n, Working Paper No. 1, 2008).
116. See Charles Ticbout, A Pur Theor of Local Expenditures. 64.1. POL. ECON. 416,
421-23 (1956). For a European version of the Tiebout thesis, see Christian Iaione, Local
Public Entiepreneurshipand ludicialInteventio in a Euro-Americanand Global Perspective, 7
WASL. U. GLOB. STUD. L. RLV. 215 (2008).
117. See Bressol v. Gouvernernent de la Communaute Fran(aise, Case C-73/08,

[2010] E.C.R. 1-2735; Austria, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5969.
118. See Regina Bidar v. Ealing London Borough Council & Another, Case C209/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-2119. Part B.2 argues that the (JEU decision in Bidar has
contributed to dismantling local redisuibutive schemes that were targeting a particular
group of less advantaged people living in the Ealing Borough rather than foreign
students coring to study in ILondon. See injra Part B.2.
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their public serv4ces). Much more, however, is at stake. For
example, a recent Scottish policy highlights an internal
controversy regarding public education that unsettles this view.
Recently, Scotland, in contrast to the British govermnent,
reaffirmed its commitment to public education by deciding to
allow Scottish and EU undergraduate students to get their
degree for free, whereas students from England, Wales, and
Northern Ireland will be charged a higher sum that might
increase up to UK-9000 per year. 119 If this case were to land
before the Luxembourg judges, they would have to unpack the
distributive effects of the Scottish education scheme. The split in
the United Kingdom is marked by Scotland's argument against
the dismantling of its reverse discrimination scheme, whereas
England, favoring the student free choice argument, would
argue in favor of dismantling the Scottish subsidy. In such a
scenario, similar to Government of the French Community,
European judges have to specify some of the distributive effects
of the Scottish education subsidy vis a vis different groups of
students. Such an exercise will entail reimagining the
elaboration of different policy arguments that can no longer
reduce the education conflict to European mobility rights versus
Member States' discriminatory policies. Rather than drawing
lines between two spheres of independent powers, the Court will
have to make a normative decision based on its views on public
education.
The table below is a schematic overview of the four
arguments that judges have used in interpreting the internal
market doctrines in connection to a supporting normative
theory.

119. See Amelia Hill.
GuIAkR)iAN

Scotland's U iversity
Fees Discrirninatou,' Sass Lawyer,

(U.K.), Aug. 21, 2011,

Itp://WWW.guardian.co.uk/lcducation/2011/aug/

2 1/scotland-university-fees-discrimninate-lawTer.
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Table 1. Four Arguments in EU Adjudication to Regulate the
Internal Market

PUBLIC
Doctrines
Limiting
Free
Movement
Competition
Law and
Public
Procurement
Rules

STATE

INDIVIDUAL

National Welfare
Exceptions to Free
Movement:

Public Policy
Exceptions to Free
Movement:

"SGEI" Exception to EC
Competition Law

Public Service
Employees
Exception for Workers

"In House" Exception to
Public Procurement
Rules

i

ConstitutionalAsymmetry
i

Constitutional Patriotism

PRIVATE

Regulatory Competition

Rights of EU Citizens

Free
Movement
Competition
Law and
Public
Procurement
Rules

Free Movement
Competition Law
Public Procurement
Rules

Free Movement of
Workers and Services

Efficiency

Free Choice

Nondiscrimination
Equal Access to
Education

C. IncludingLocal Stakes in judicialBalancing
The invisibility of cities in European adjudication is deeply
connected to the idea that EU law has fostered of two
autonomous spheres of power: the Union and its Member
States. In balancing the powers of these two conflicting actors to
regulate the internal market on the one hand and welfare
policies on the other, the Court assumed the latter would be
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controlled by Member States' governments. There is, however, a
tremendous variation in Europe on which local, regional, or
federal actors can adopt social policy depending on the
decentralization of power in each Member State.120 For instance,
German Lander have a greater ability than Italian regions to
regulate the delivery of public healthcare in hospitals and the
allocation of education subsidies. In addition, because of
different types of decentralization of power existing in each
Member State, there are important interlocal differences in the
quality of public health and education services that vary
enormously from land-to-land or region-to-region.'21 For
instance, there is tremendous interlocal variation in the quality
of services provided by hospitals between northern and southern
Italy. Likewise, in both Belgium and England, the quality and
prestige of education varies tremendously between schools
situated in Brussels and London, the respective capitals, when
compared with schools in the rest of the country.
Finally, the invisibility of cities in EU adjudication harkens
back to their status in contemporary liberal thought. Cities are
an association of citizens or a public institution that lies between
states and individuals. 122 Cities remain invisible in a legal system
that creates rights and obligations vis a vis states and individuals
only.' 123 Not surprisingly, EU judges have framed arguments by
addressing either individual rights or national policies in the
context of public or private relations while overlooking city
policies. Thus, EU adjudication has remained blind to the
implications of city power. Alternatively, one might suppose that
James Madison's approach, depicting cities as dangerous
factions for the construction of the US Union, has prevailed in
EU law.124 Here, cities are state creatures that have been
120. See Fernanda Nicola, The False Promise ofDecentralization in EU Cohesion Policy,
20 TUL.,J. 1NT'L & ComP.L. 65 (2011).
121. Id.
122. See Frug, supra note 3, at 1076 n.80 (citing OTTO GIFRKE, POLITICAL
THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE ALES (Frederic William Matiland uans., 1958)); see also
FERDINAND TONNIES, GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESEISCHAFT (Charles P. Loomis trans.,
1957).
123. See Frug, supra note 3.
124. See GERALD E. FRU- ET AL., I OCAV (OVERNMENT LAW/ 557 (3d ed. 200 1). The
authors begin their casebook by highlighting these two opposite conceptions of
decentralization of power. A skeptical vision of decentralization of power goes back to
james Madison and his justification of the US Union in Federalist Paper No. 10 as a way
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dismissed in EU adjudication, which depicts them as being
either state subdivisions acting in their public capacity or mere
125
market actors acting in their private capacity.
This Essay analyzes the absence of and suggests including
cities in the policy arguments made by judges in interpreting
internal market rules. While cities are crucial local actors
because of their democratic and redistributive potential, cities
also
pose
threats
to
European
integration
through

discriminatory and exclusionary policies.
I. THE CITY AND THE IN\TERNAL MARKET
Mhen he enters the territoiy of which Eutropia is the
capital, the traveler sees not one city but many, of equal
size and not unlike one another.., but all these cities
together; only one isinhabited at a time, the others are
empty; and this process is carried out in rotation. -N1owI
shall tell you how. On the day when Eutropias
inhabitantsfeel the grip of weariness and no one can
bear any longer his job, his relatives, his house and his
life, debts, the people he must greet or who greet him.,
then the whole citizeny decides to move to the next city,
which is there waitingfbr them, empty and good as new;

there each will take up a new job, a different wie, will
see another landscape on opening his window, and will
spend his time with, dfJferent pastimes, friends,
gossip.... Thus the city repeats its lift, identical,
12
shifting up and down on its empty chessboard. 6
This Part analyzes three different doctrines through which
judges have shaped the internal market: free movement of
goods, competition law, and public procurement rules. Like the
city of Eutropia, the Court looks at cities in a context where
people, services, and goods are interchangeable and citizens
to "break and control the violence of faction." Id. at 12. A more positive vision of

decentralization prompted by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America refers to
towns as "the only association which isso perfectly natural, that, wherever people come
together, it seems to constitutc itself" Id.at 3.
125. See Frug, spra note ?.
126. CAIVINO, supra note 1, at 64.
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look forward to moving from place to place with little cost. The
rules of the chessboard that regulate the internal market are
shaped by the Union, the states, and their citizens. Cities are
empty containers: sometimes they are the agents of the states,
while other times they are private corporations competing for
services.
A. Free Movement for Cities: Maastricht Coffee Shop
The Treaty of Lisbon establishes that the powers of the
European Union should be limited to those specifically
conferred on it by the Treaty. 127 In practice, however, the
allocation of power between the European Union and its
Member States is neither clear nor stable over time.' 2 8 There is a
traditional perception that it is the responsibility of the
European Union to adopt internal market regulations in order
to promote the "free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital,"' 21 while individual Member States retain autonomy to
regulate public welfare. Despite the expansion of competences
of the Union, , lawyers still embrace this longstanding private
(market regulation) versus public (social welfare) dichotomy,
using it to draw a line between the competences of the
European Union and its Member States.' 3 '
The free movement of goods provision empowers the
European courts to void any legislative or other measure that

127. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 6. art. 5. 2010 O.J. C 83, at 18 ("I.The limits
of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union
courpetences isgoverned by the principles of subsidiarit and proportionality. 2. Under
the principle of conterral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences
conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out
therein. ( olnpetences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the
Member States."). For an analogous provision in United States, See U.S. CONST.amend.
X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.").

128. See CRA-G & DL BLRCA,supra note 21, at 74-87 (discussing the problems that
arise with conferral).
129. TFEU, supra note 4. art. 26. 2010 O.J. C 83, at 59.
130. See PAUL CRABG, THL LISBON TRLATY: LAw, POLITICS, AN[) TREATY REFORM

(2011).
131. See Nicola, supra note 103, at 13-14; Okeoghene Odudu, The PublilPrivate
Distinction in EU Internal Varket Law, 46 RLVUE TRIMLSTRILLLE DE I)ROIT EULROPIEN

826, 829-34 (2010).
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creates a quantitative restriction on trade.13 This "European
dormant commerce clause" jurisprudence was possible due to
the Court's interpretation of the primacy of EU law is A vis
Member States' laws.1 3 The dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence of the CJEU fostered "negative integration,"
through deregulation by striking down national and municipal
measures limiting the free movement of goods in the internal
market.134 In interpreting Article 34 of the TFEU judges have
used different policy arguments to address the Member States'
welfare concerns that conflict with the free movement rules of
the internal market.' 5 In doing so, the CJEU has created some
important exceptions to its free movement jurisprudence,
upholding social policies that conflict with free movement but
13
that were justified by national welfare goals.
In the Rewe-Zentral A. G. v Bundesmonopolv,erawaltungtiir
Brannitwein, also known as the Cassis case, the CJEU held that a
"mandatory
requirement,"
or
a
state
interest,
if
nondiscriminatory and proportionate, could legitimately restrict
132. TFEU, supra note 4, art. 34, 2010 O.. C 83, at 61 ("Quantitative restrictions
on imports and all neasures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited benween
Member States."); see Donald H. Reagan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. IL REV. 1091, 1178-79 (1986)
(discussing Europe's interests in promoting the free movement of goods); Richard (
Schragger, Cities, Economic Deelopment, and the Free Trade Constitution, 94 VA. L REV.
1091, 1117 (2008) (discussing international uade iore generally).
133. See Costa v. Ente Nazionale per 'Energia Elcttrica (ENEL), Case 6/64,
1964] E.C.R. 585, at 593-94; see also (GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EUROPEAN UNION IAW 247-56 (3d ed. 1993).
134. See FRITZ SCHARPF, GOVLRNIN(, EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DLMORCATic (2001).

The (CJFU jurisprudence has made large use of the TFEU's prohibition against
measures having equivalent to quantitative restrictions" to trade. TFEU, sup a note 4,
art. 34. 2010 O.J. C 83, at 61. This was mostly adopted against protectionist Meiber
States' policies rather than against local government's law. However, the TFEU itself, as
well as the (CJEU jurisprudence, has limited the reach of the European dormant
commerce clause to public policy matters such as health even though the (CJEU has
been severe in its scrutiny. See BERM ANN ET AL., supra note 133, at 479.
135. See Fernanda G. Nicola. Transatlanticists:ConstitutionalAs mmetr and Selective
Reception of L.S. Law and Economics in the Formation of European Private Law, 16 CARL)OZO
J. INT'L & COIP. L 87, 144-46 (2008) (explaining constitutional asmmeytr in the
context of social justice in European contract law).

136. Some of the exceptions to the fee movement, were already present in Article
36 of the TFEU, but the (JEU jurisprudence has expanded the list of exceptions and
introduced the Cassis test with a proportionality principle. See, e.g., Cindthque SA &
Others v F6ddration Nationale des Cindmnas Franlais, Joined Cases 60-61/84, [1985]
E.C.R. 2605.
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the free movement of goods.1 3 7 In other words, the Court
established that only national public policies justified by a state
interest could limit the application of the "free trade
constitution."' 138 This meant that city policies departing from
national ones and conflicting with the European free trade rules
were likely to be struck down by the Courts. The legal invisibility
of cities began with this doctrine.
In contrast to its holding in Cassis, however, in the Sunday
Tradingcase, the Court showed sensitivity to state-local dynamics
when it determined that the proportionality test had to take into
account the existence of different local values. 3 The CJEU held
that although it could have found a prohibition against Sunday
trading in England to be justified as a social policy, the domestic
courts could best determine whether the policy in questions was
proportionate to its goal or whether it overly burdened the free
movement of goods.1411 When faced with having to assess the
implication of a social policy embedded in moral and religious
values, which were not homogenous even throughout England,
the Court preferred to grant the last word to the domestic
courts.141

In contrast to the Sunday Trading case, in the Josemans v.
Burgemeester van Alaastricht, also known as the Mlaastricht Coffee
Shop case,1 42 the court showed little deference to conflicting local
interests. In this case, the owner of a Dutch coffee shop selling
marijuana was obliged to shut down his business because he
violated a city ordinance that banned the sale of marijuana to
non-Dutch citizens. 143 Mr. Josemans challenged the city

137. Cassis, Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649,
8, 14-15. In interpreting Article
34 of the TFEU, the Court asserted its competence to assess the intrinsic
reasonableness of all national health, safety, or environmental product regulations that
could have a negative impact on cross-border uade. See MADURO, supra note 83, at 10408.
138. See general Schragger, supra note 132 (using the term "free trade
conil itLion ").

139. See SundaT Trading, Case C-145/88. [1989] E.C.R. 1-3851. 12.
140. See Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent v.B & Q Pc,Case -169/91, [1992]
E.C.R. 1-6635.
141. See Simon Deakin, Sunday Trading: Simone Uses and Abuses of European Law, 52
CAMBRIDGE I.J. 364, 366 (1993).
142. See Joscmans v. Burgemecster van Maastricht. Case C-137/09, [2010] E.C.R.
I

(delivered Dec. 16, 2010) (nrot yet reported).

143. See Daley, supra note 12, at Al.
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ordinance on the grounds that it denied to non-Dutch the
possibility of smoking cannabis and receiving other services
provided by the coffee shop, such as the provision of
nonalcoholic beverages and food. The Court upheld the city
ordinance. 4' 4
The Court held that because narcotic drugs are distributed
through strictly controlled channels for medical purposes, they
are prohibited from commercial sale. Thus, insofar as the
marketing of cannabis is concerned, a coffee shop proprietor
cannot rely on the freedoms of movement or the principle of
nondiscrimination to object to municipal rules such as the
Maastricht ordinance. As to the argument based on the general
prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of nationality in
relation to the freedom to provide services,14 5 the CJEU held
that such overt discrimination was justified by a mandatory
interest, namely the fight against drug tourism. This
justification, the Court held, could legitimately create a
restriction on the free movement of services through a
proportionate and necessary measure to reach the policy
14
objective. 6
Six months after the Josemans decision, in June 2011, the
Dutch Council of State declared that the mayor's decision to
close the Easy Going coffee shop was incompatible with the
Dutch Opium Act that already banned the sale of cannabis in
the Netherlands, despite a policy of tolerance towards soft drugs,
which allows the sale of marijuana in coffee shops. The
administrative court held that the city of Maastricht, in adopting
the drug ordinance, had violated Dutch administrative law in
overstepping its authority vis a Nis the state.1 47 Soon after,
however, in October 2011 the Maastricht local authorities began
sponsoring a voluntary ban among coffee shops that was in fact
supported by a right-wing government coalition in The
Hague. 14 This coalition pushed for a bill to fight drug tourism
144. SeeJosenains. [2010] E.C.R. 1
, 1[1[
54, 83-84.
145. THEU, sopra note 4, arts. 19, 56, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 56, 70.
146. SeeJosernans, [2010] E.C.R. I
, [[ 65-66.
147. See Mayor's (losurc of Maastricht Coffco Shop Ruled Unlawftul,
ATV 11 iRS102373, at 1 (June 29, 2011), http:/iwww.raacvanstate.nipersi/maastricht%
20cofttccshop%20pcrs bcricht%20engcls.pdfl
148. See Giles Scott-Sinith, Populist Puff 1. HOLLAND BUREAU, O . 18, 2011,
http:/iiT.thehollandbureau.comitag/na-c-josemansi
(citing
MBas
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that was much contested in Parliament. Some Members of
Parliament called the bill "tourism suicide," and municipalities
such as Amsterdam opposed its passage . 4 The law passed. It
restricted access to the coffee shops to residents of the
Netherlands. This law is now in force in the southern part of the
Netherlands, the area most affected by drug tourism, and will
enter into force in the rest of the country on January 1, 2013.150
This internal Dutch struggle and the resistance to the
Josemans decision was in part caused by the overreliance by the
CJEU on a national mandatory interest: the fight against drug
tourism. What the Court confused for a statewide policy was in
reality an open struggle among cities with conflicting agendas
towards the sale of soft drugs. With the josemans decision, the
CJEU intervened profoundly in state-local matters by
empowering cities like Maastricht, which are in favor of a
statewide restriction to coffee shops for tourists, at the expense
of cities like Amsterdam, which embrace their history of
tolerance towards soft drugs and which have profitable
commercial activities deriving from coffee shop tourism. The
Court further transformed a contested local interest, namely the
fight against drug tourism, into a European goal of preventing
and eliminating the trafficking of drugs in the Union.'51
B. The Competition Exemption Jor Cities
EU competition provisions enshrined in the TFEU apply
indiscriminately to both Member States and local governments
without the sort of immunity provided in the Eleventh

Canrabis Coffee-Shop Tourists, 11W NEWs (Sept. 30, 2011, 21:25 ET),
http://wNi.bbc.co.uk/news/world-curope-15134669).
149. See, e.g., Ban on Tourists Visiting Dutch Cannabis Cafes Will Go Ahead. DAILY
MAll (U. K.), Nov. 15, 2011, http:/iwww.dailymail.co.kitravel/article-2061730/I)utchcannabis-coffce-shops-ban-touristszJanuary-l-new-ruling.html
("The Dutch justice
minisLi) announced the ban [on cannabis-selling coffee shops] ... despite opposition
from some [Members of Parliament] wvho branded the move 'tourism suicide.'");
Netherlands Judge Backs Cafe Cannabis Ban, BBC NLWS (Apr. 27, 2012 5:50 AM),
http://wN.bbc.co.uk/news/worid-urope-17865151 ("[T]he nationwide ban is being
strongly opposed by the Mayor ofAmsterdam, Eberhard van der Laan, because around
a third of tihe city's tourists visit to smoke cannabis in the cafes.")
150. See Ban on Tourists Visitin Dutch CannabisCafes Will Go Ahead, supra note 149.
151. SeeJosenans, [2010] E.C.R. 1,
40.
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Amendment of the US Constitution. 15 2 In contrast, European
jurisprudence on competition law has gone a long way in
condemning private, as well as public, undertakings for
infringing antitrust provisions and in scrutinizing state services
under competition rules. 153 The main competition provisions
contained in Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU prevent firms
from restricting or distorting competition by engaging in
anticompetitive behavior or abusing their power from a
1 4
dominant position on the market.

152. U.S Const. amend.XI ("The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any

Foreign State."). In the United States, the US Supreme Court has limited the
application of lederal antitrust law when a local action is clearly articulated as state
policy and it is supelvised by the state. FRU G ET Al., sopra note 124, at 250-51 (citing
Town ofHallie v. City of Eau Claie 471 U.S. 34 (1985), to indicate that a state statute
must "say expressly that anticompetitive activity was authorized"). When local
governments undertake anticourpetitive behavior, the Supreme Court has expanded
the state imiuniy to include their activities as long as their action has been authorized
by the state, in line with the theory that cities are creatures or state subdivisions. Id.
(citing Lallie to illustrate that the "anticompetitive activity of cities"
need not be
"actively supervised by the state"). In Parkerv. Brown. the Supreme Court suengthened
the notion of state immunitv from the Sherman Act by resorting to the dual federalism
theory in order to allow sovereign states to maintain anticompetitive behaviors, despite
federal legislation. 317 U.S. 341 (1943); see S. Paul Posner, The Proper Relationship
Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U . .REV. 693, 698-99
(1974). However, Supreme Court jurisprudence has created a state immunity that
precludes federal antitrust legislation rol regulating state action but not necessarily
the action of cities when these act by virtue of their independent home rule power. See
Cnt. Conmmc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56-57 (1982) ("Judicial
entorcement of Congress' will regarding the statc-action exemption renders a State 'no
less able to allocate governmentl power between itself and itspolitical subdivisions. It
means only that when the State itself has not directed or authorized an anticoupetiive
practice, the State's subdivisions in exercising their delegated power must obey the
antitrust laws.' (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,
416 (1978))): see also Schragger, supra note 132, at 1123. Some work has been done in
this respect to compare antitrust and competition law provisions vis vispublic and
private action. See BERMANN ET A[_, spra note 133, at 1043-86; Luc Gyselen, Anti
Competitive State Action in the Area of the Liberal Professions: An EU/US Comparative Law
Perspective, in EUROPLAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2004, at 353 (Claus-Diettr
Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2004).
153. See France, Italy, & United Kingdom v.Commission, Joined Cases 188-90/80,
[1982] E.C.R. 2545: see also GB-INNO-BM v. Vcreniging van de Kkinhandelaars in
Tabak (INNO v.ATAB), Case 13/77, [1977] E.C.R. 2115.
154. TFEU, supra note 4, arts. 101-02, 2010 O:J. C 83. at 88-89; see also id.art.
101 (2), at 88 ("Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be

automatically void.").

2012]

INAISIBLE CITIES IN EUROPE

1323

Whenever a public undertaking is at stake, however, Ar ticle
106 of the TFEU comes into play. This Article creates a limited
exemption from competition law only as far as public
administration would be hindered by competition rules from
performing a service of general economic interest.' 55 This
provision allows the Court to determine if public or private
undertakings involving an economic activity violate competition
rules because of the type of service they are performing. When
conducting an economic activity, the Court can apply the
competition law exemption of Article 106(2) of the TFEU' to a
company under the total or partial control of a municipality.
The Commission has defined economic activity broadly to mean
"any activity consisting in offering goods and services."15 6
The concept of services of general economic interest
("SGEI") first appeared in Community law in the 1960s and
1970s.157 In the 1980s, the Court held that state interests could
be exempted from the free movement provisions in the Treaty
only in SGEI instances.1 8The CJEU jurisprudence shifted the
burden onto the Member States to prove that a particular SGEI,
despite its economic implications, should be exempted from
competition law because of its national solidarity goals. As
market liberalization took place and the privatization of services
155. Id. art. 106, at 90-91 ("(l) In the case of public undertakings and
undertakings to which Member states grant special or exclusive rights, Member States
shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained
in the Treaties, in particular to those rules provided fbr in Article 18 and Articles 10 to
109. (2) Undertakings entrusted with the operation of serices of general economic
interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to
the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far
as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact. of
the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to
such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Union.").
156. See Commission of the European C o1mnunities, Services of General Interests:
Green Paper f-omn the Commission, COM (2003) 270 Final,
45 (May 2003)
[hereinafter Green Paper].
157. See (RAIG & DE 11LURCA, supra note 21, at 1073-74; Catherine HaguenauMoizard, Book Review, 14 EUR. PUB. L. 269 (2008) (reviewing LLS SLRVI(CES D'INTLR.T
ECONOMIQUE G NERAI ET 'UNION EUROPEENNE caean-Victor Louis & St4phane
Rodrigues eds., 2006)).
158. See Commission v. Belgium, Case 149/79, [1980] E.C.R. 3881, J[ 9-10
(holding that the concept of public administration cannot obstruct the application of

(ommunity rules on the tiecdom of mnovenent of workers and advocating to keep the
exception only for posts involving the exercise of powers conferred by public law and

posts aimed at saleguarding the general interests of the state).
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increased, the definition of SGEI by the Court became central to
the creation of the internal market.15
Today, basic services such as public health, social services,
and education are increasingly classified as SGEI. They are
administered in radically different ways by national or local
public administrations16 ° In 1996, the European Commission
acknowledged the importance of SGEI 101 The 1997 Treaty of
Amsterdam added a further protection of SGEI in the text of
what is today Article 14 of the TFEU. 62 Finally, the importance
of SGEI was reinstated in a Green Paper published in 2006 by
the Commission,'163 in anticipation of the highly controversial
Ser ices or "Bolkestein" Directive. 1 4 Despite the fear that the
159. The situation changed rapidly in the mid-1980s when the full protection of
states' public services ended as a result of economic and ideological pressures triggered
by tire transnational liberalization of services and the demise of communist regimes. See
EUROPEAN INST. OF PUB. ADMIN., A NEW SPACE FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS AND
SERVICES OF GENERAIl
INTEREST IN AN ENLARGED UNION: STUDY INTENDED FOR THE
MINISTERS RESPONSIBIE FOR PUBic ADMINISTRATION OF TFHE MEMBER STATES OF TFHE
EUROPEAN UNION 6 (2005), available at http://ww.arlhiv.mLj.gov.si/fileadmin/
mj .gov.si pagenploadsimju dokiumenti/pdf/LITU DE un nouvelespace pour les

adn.pubEN.pdf.
160. See Henri Courivaud, Le Droit de laConcurrence Contre les
Libertes Communales?
L'exemple des S adtwerke Allenmandes Confrontes a'[a Liberalisation du Secuear de lElecticite,
14 REUE INTERNATIONAI FE

)ROIT ECONOMIQUE 405 (2000).

161. See Commission of the European Communities, Seivices of General Interest
in Europe: Communication from the Commission, COM (96) 443 Final, at lb (Sept.
11, 1996). The Commission defines services of general interest as "tarket and nonmarket services which the public authorities class as being of general interest and
subject to specific public service obligations." Id.at 2.In the Commission's view, these
services "meet basic needs" and "play an important role as social cement over and
above simple practical considerations. They also have a symbolic value, reflecting a
sense of community that people can identify with. They form part of the cultural
identity of everyday lift in all European countries." Id. at 3. They are "meant to
serve ... societ as a whole and therefore all those living in it." Id.
162. See TFEU, supra note 4, art. 14, 2010 O.j C 83, at 54 q [G]iven the place
occupied by services of general economic interest in the shared values of the Union as
well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion, the Union and the
Member States, each within their respective powers and within the scope of application
the Treaties, shall take care that such services operate on tire basis of principles and
conditions, particularly economic and financial conditions, which enable them to fulfill
their missions.").
163. See Green Paper, supra note 156. at 18. 63.
164. Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
on Services in the Internal Market, 2006 ().J. L 376/36 [hereinafter Services Directive];
see Laura Petricola, Frankenstein Directive Passes European Lion Parliament, PEOPLE'S
WORLD (Feb. 24 2006), http://wvw.peoplesworll.org/-fiankenstein-directive-passesenropean-nnioni-parliament/.

20121

IATISIBLE CITIES IN EUROPE

1325

services directive would create a race to the bottom in the
internal market through a wild liberalization of services in the
aftermath of European Eastern enlargement, the scope of the
directive was limited with respect to SGEI. 1' 5 Thus, European
adjudication remains central in interpreting the Treaty
provisions such as Article 106(2) of the TFEU. Under this
provision, the Court can decide whether a public administration
will benefit from a competition exemption because it provides a
service that involves the distribution of a public good with a
solidarity goal. 166

165. See Services Directive, supra note 164, art. 1(2), at 50 ("This Directive does
not dcal with the liberalisation of services of general economic interest, reserved to
public or private entities, nor with the privatisation of public entities providing
selvices."). In particular, the directive expressly provides that:
It is appropriate that the provisions of this Directive concerning the fr eedom
of establishment and the free movement of services should apply only to the
extent that the activities in quctLion are open to compctition, so that they do
not oblige Member States either to liberalise services of general economic
interest or to privatise public entities which provide such services or to
abolish existing monopolies for other activities or certain distibution
serlvces.

Id. pmbl.
8, at 37. Moreover, the directive specifies lurther its limited area ol
application with respect to services of general economic interest ("SGEI"), which is
directly inspired by the provision of the Treaty and its interpretation by the
jurisprudence of the Court. This directive covers only:
Services which are performed foir an economic consideration.... Selvices of
general economic interest are services that are performed for an economic
consideration and therelore do lall within the scope of this )irective.
However, certain services of general economic interest, such as those that
may exist in the field of transport. are excluded fr om the scope of this
Directive and certain other services of general economic interest, for
example, those that may exist in the area of postal services, arc the subject of
a derogation fr om the provision on the ficcdom to provide selvices set out in
this Directive. This Directive does not deal with the funding of services of
general economic interest and does not apply to systems of aids granted by
Member states, in particular in the social field, in accordance with
Communitv rules on competition.
Id. pmbl. 1[ 17. at 38.
166. See TFEU, supra note 4. art. 106, 2010()OJ. C 83. at 90-91. In US law, the
exceptions to competition law tend to be limited when cities act in their proprietary
function. When Cities act as market participants, the Parker exception (see supra note
152) is not likely to apply, even though in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,
Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991), the US Supreme Court recognized that " I t]he very purpose
of zoning regulation is to displace unfettcrid business freedom in a manner that
regularly has the effect of preventing normal acits of competition, particularly on the

part of new entrants." Id. at 373; see Schragger, s pla note 132, at 1124.
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For instance, the Court dealt with this issue in Gemeente
Alrreo v. Energ7ebedrifljsserrij NIJ '. This case involved a 1918
Dutch Royal Order that granted Energiebedrijfljsselmij NV
("IJM"), a private company that supplied electricity to local
distributors, "a non-exclusive concession to distribute electricity
within" a certain territory, including rural areas.' 7 This Royal
Order limited local distributers to IJM when purchasing
electricity, which led the distributors to file suit when ]JM raised
prices on January 1,

19 8 5

.1

1JM had initiated the increase in

prices in attempt to equalize the costs it incurred distributing
electricity to consumers in rural areas, which were significantly
higher than in urban areas where the required infrastructure
already existed. 9 The local distributors in urban areas, who
initiated arbitration proceedings concerning "the legality of the
equalization supplement imposed by IJM," were bearing the
brunt of these costs. 7 " Their claim was initially rejected at the
local level, but on appeal the national court insisted the lower
court provide a preliminary ruling, "suggesting that without the
import ban IJM could probably not have imposed the
equalization supplement. 1 According to the Court, the Dutch
model of cooperation between the state and the local authorities
on the distribution of electricity was strong evidence that the
electricity regime was properly administered as an SGEI. 7 2 In
highlighting the convergence between local and state interests,

167. Gemeente Almelo & Others v. Energiebedrjfljsselmi NV (lmelo), Case C393/92. [1994] E.C.R. 1-1477, 5. The US Supreme Court addressed similar issues in
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &. Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), wherein
government-owned electric utility systems brought action against competing, privatelyowned electric utility on charges of tderal antitrust violation. Id. at 389.
168. Ablelo. [1994] E.C.R. 1-1477. [ 6, 11. 19.
169. Id. 11.
170. Id. 19.
171. Id. 20.
172. See id. 38; see also id.
31, 35 (emphasizing the cooperation). In its
judgment. the Court found that:
The disuribution of electricity is organized at regional and local level. Within
the territory granted to them, the regional distribution undertakings supply
the local distribution undertakings owned by the iuniucipalities and, in some
cases, the end-users. The local distribution undertakings handle supplies to
customers within the municipalities. The production and distribution
undertakings are owned, directly or indirectly, by the provinces and

municipalities.
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the CJEU held that unless the national court ruled otherwise,
the equalization supplement was not a violation of competition
rules, but rather was a mechanism to fulfill the SGEI function of
the Dutch electric company.173
Each Member State, however, administers SGEI with
different rationales and through different mechanisms that
often prompt conflicts between states and municipalities. An
important example of such state-local tensions is the
jurisprudence over port authorities. Major cities with wellestablished harbors often have the power to use local ordinances
to grant exclusive rights to one company to manage the basic
services of the harbor. The Porto di Gemova case has substantially
contributed to the case law regulating the competition law
174
exemption for services of general economic interest.
In Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova SpA v. Siderurgica
Gabrielli SpA, the CJEU held that the exclusive right to supply
labor was not protected by the exemption of Article 106(2) of
the TFEU.1 75 In this case, the company Merci Convenzionali
Porto di Genova SpA had an exclusive concession for handling
the loading operations on the docks of Genoa. However,

173. See id. 51 (c) ("Article 90(2) of the Treaty is to be interpreted as meaning
that the application by a regional electricity distributor of such an exclusive purchasing
clause is not caught by the prohibitions contained in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty in
so tar as that restriction of competition is necessary in order to enable that undertaking
to pelforim its task of general interest. It is for the national court to consider whether
that condition is lullilled.").
174. In Commission Decision No. 97/745/EC (Re Tariffs for Piloting in the Port of
Genoa), 1997 O. L 301/27. arts. 1-2. and in Corsica Ferries Italia Srl v. Corpodei Piloti del
Porto di Genova, Case (-18/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1783,
45, the Commission and the
Court respectively condemned the tariffs set tor pilotage services in Genoa and the
Commission held that the subsequently amended tariff infringed Article 86 of the
TFEU regarding tariffs for piloting in the Port of Genoa. In Corsica Ferries France v.
GruppoAntichi Ormeggiatoridel Porto di Genova. Case C-266/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-3949, the
Court held that the mcre grant of exclusive rights tor the supply of Ilmooring selwices

did not in itself breach Article 86 of the TFEU and that the tariffs required to be
charged fell within the derogation under Article 90(2). Id. 1[ 40-41. 47.
175. See generally Merci, Case C-179/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5889. Alticle 86(1) of the
TFEU could not be invoked in the case of a breach of a provision not having direct
effect, such as Article 87. See, e.g., id. J[ 23 (noting that "the provisions of Article
[] ... 86 of the [TFEU] have direct effect and give rise for interested parties to rights
which the national courts must protect"). The Commission subsequently held that the
Italian legislation as revised to comply with the Merci ruling was still contrary to the
Trea[y. See Commission Decision 97/744/EC (Re Provisions of Italian Pors Legislation

Relating to Employment), 1997 ().J. I 301 /17, arts. 1-2.
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unloading imported goods had been delayed because of a strike,
causing the Siderurgica Gabrielli company to sue to recover the
money paid as well as damages because of poor service. The
Tribunale di Genova referred the case to the CJEU, asking if
competition rules precluded an undertaking from being
granted an exclusive right to dock work for a company whose
workforce was composed exclusively of nationals who were
mostly unionized. The CJEU held that such a dock-work
company, as described by the question, did not satisfy the
function of an SGEI and thus did not benefit from the
exception to competition rules."
Commentators have argued that Article 106(2) of the
TFEU is applicable only when the violation of competition rules
is "indispensable for the proper operation of the service of
general economic interest," often coinciding with broader
177
justification that is defined as a national mandatory interest.
In this respect, unionized labor was not considered an SGEI
characterized as a public good, or better, a state interest,
because it was too limited to a particular group of unionized
78
workers, historically called "camalli" in the Port of Genoa.
The attack on labor unions as potential obstacles to the
functioning of the internal market rather than as the expression
of democratic associations goes much further in other recent
7
cases, to which Porlo di Genova can be seen as the precursor.1 9
In a subsequent case, Calh v. Servizi Ecologci Porto di
GenovaSpA (SEPG), while addressing another exclusive grant
from Porto di Genova to a public undertaking performing
176. Merci, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5889, 1 24, 27-28.
177. See Luc (Gyselcn, Case C-192190, Merci Convenzionali Porto di (enova SpA v.
Siderurgica Gabrielli SpAJudgrment of 1ODecember 1991 (Full Court), rot yet reported; Case
C-18 88 Regie des Telegraphes et des Tc0lphones v.SA "GB-Inno-BM",J1!.crnent of 13
Decemnber 1992 (Fifth chamber), not Yet reported, 29 COMMON MKT. L. RLV. 1229, 1245
(1992).
178. See generally C AU)IO COSTANTINi, LA RLPUBBLICA DI GENOVA (1987).
179. See, e.g.,
Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n v.Viking Line ABP (Vikig), Case C438 05, [2007]
E.C R.
1-10779:
Laval
un
Partneri
Ltd. v. Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareiorbundet (Laval), Case C-341/05. [2007] E.C.R. 1-11767: see also
Brian Bercusson. The Trade I nion "ovemert ard the European ,
Tnion: Judgment Day, 13
EUR. LJ. 279, 281 (2007): Michael Dougan, Fees. Grants. Loans and Dole Cheques: Who
Covers the Costs of Migrajt Educatio'n .'7thin the EU, 42 COMMON MKT. L. RLV. 943
(2005); Christian Joerges & Florian RCdl, fnjbrmal Politics, Fornalised Law atrd the 'Social
Deficit' of European Integ-ration: Reflections After the Judgments o the ECJ in Viking and
lava1,
15 UR I. 1, 10-13 (2009).
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antipollution services, the Court reached the opposite
conclusion.180 There, the CJEU held that competition law
provisions are not "applicable to anti-pollution surveillance with
which a body governed by private law has been entrusted by the
public authorities in an oil port of a Member State, even where
port users must pay dues to finance that activity."'' The Court
held that because an exception was envisioned in this case,
competition law did not apply. 8 2 The convincing opinion of AG
Cosmas, relying on environmental values, stated that "it affords
the Court of Justice an opportunity to clarify to what extent
protection of the environment is or is not a core public
authority activity and, consequently, whether a body whose main
task is preventing pollution is exercising an activity that
constitutes a state responsibility.18 :
In dismissing the local dimension of this case, the Court
held that competition law did not apply because antipollution
surveillance "is a task in the public interest which forms part of

180. See Calt v. Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova SpA (SEPG), Case C-343/95.
[1997] E.C.R. 1-1547.
181. Id. 25.
182. Id. In this case, the body governed by public authorities was the Consorzio
Autonomo del Porto ("CAP"), which managed the Port of Genoa until 1994 and then
was replaced by the Autorit5 Portuale. Id. 1[ 3. In an order dated August 23. 1991. the
President of the CAP created "a compulsory smuveillance and rapid intervention service
intended to protect maritime areas against any pollution caused by accidental
discharges of hydrocarbons into the sea" and gave Scivizi Ecologici Porto di Genova
SpA ("SEPG") an exclusive concession to run and collect tees for it. Id. [1 5-8. On
August 30, 1991, the President of (AlP approved tarifl that SEPG was authorized to
apply. Diego Call and FigliSrl ("Cali"), a peuochemical shipping company that used
the port, refused to pay the fees "on the ground that it had never requested nor had
recourse to [the] services." Id. 11 11, 9-10. In response to a petition by SEPG, the
Tribunale di Genovaordered (art to pay the fees, but in the course of those
proceedings tferred the case to the Court asking whether there was an abuse of
dominant position by SEPG and if it was exempted under Article 106(2) of the THEU.
Id. 11 12-13.
183. Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas. Cali, [1997] E.C.R. at 1-1549. [ 3. As
Advocate General Cosmas stated:
This case calls for consideration of the extent to which the various services
compulsorily provided by the ports in the Member States are compatible with
Article 86 of the Treaty. The issue here bears certain similarities to the
question raised in an earlier reLfeence by the same court in the case of Merci
Convenzionali Porto di Genova v Siderurgica Gabrielli ....

I. 1 2.
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the essential functions of the State as regards protection of the
environment in maritime areas."184

In a similar case involving the municipality of
Copenhagen's system for collecting "non-hazardous building
waste" the Court was adamant that environmental values were a
valid state goal.18 5 In 1993, a Danish company applied to the
government of Copenhagen for approval to pursue its activities,
recycling building waste, within the city. After Copenhagen
approved the company's application, it contracted with the Port
of Copenhagen to set up a plant there. To actually process waste
from within the city of Copenhagen at that plant, however, the
company needed separate city approval, which the city refused
to grant. Thus, in effect, the company was only allowed to collect
building waste from neighboring municipalities of Copenhagen.
The company brought an action against the city of Copenhagen
in domestic court, claiming that it "had no authority to prevent
third parties from shipping [their] building waste" to the
8
company's plant.1 6
The CJEU held that the management of waste "may
properly be considered to be capable of forming the subject of a
service of general economic interest, particularly where the
87
service is designed to deal with an environment problem."'
184. Cali, [1997] E.C.R. 1-1547, 22.
185. See Entreprenrforieningens Affalds/Miljosektion (FFAD) v. Kobenhavns
Kommune, Case C-209/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-3743, [[2. 75. 83, 88.
186. Id. 28. The Danish court referred the case to the (JEU,asking if Article
106(2) of the TFEU could be:
[C]onstirued as precluding the establishment of a municipal system whichwith a view to ensuring that specially selected undertakings willhave
sufficiently large access to environiCntally non-hazardous building waste
destined tor recovery from private builders to enable those undertakings to
exploit that waste on an economically justifiable and rational basis-excludes
other undertakings from collecting and recciving the same type of waste.
Id. 29(1) (a).
187. Id. 75. The Court held that Article 106 of the TFEU:
[D] oes not preclude the establishnint of a local system, such as the system at
issue in the main procCedings, under which. in order to resolve an
environmental problem resulting from the absence of processing capacity for
non-hazardous building waste destined tor recoveri, a limited number of
specially selected undertakings may process such waste produced in the area
concerned, thus making it possible to ensure a sufficiently large flow of such
waste to those undertakings, which precludes other undertakings from
processing that waste, even though they are qualified to do so.

Id. 83.
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The Commission's Directorate General for Competition Law,
commenting on this case, stated that Article 106(2) of the TFEU
generally does not apply to companies that are directly
entrusted by Member States to operate SGEI but that waste
management "may constitute a service of general economic

interest." 188

In these cases, the Court depicts environmental values as
shared on a nationwide agenda and within the internal market.
While this might be true for Denmark, where there is a
widespread pro-environment culture, it would certainly not be
the case for countries such as Greece or Italy, where numerous
conflicts have arisen in state-local matters over the
implementation of environmental regulations because of
internal divides.189
C. In-House Exemption to Public Procurement
ELU
law
intervenes
significantly
in
municipal
decisionmaking in the regulation of public procurement
contracts involving the purchasing of goods and services by
public administrations. In the late 1970s, the European
Economic Community began regulating the field of public
procurement in order to increase cross-border competition in
sectors in which public authorities purchase goods and services
through contracts.19) EU public procurement directives
coordinate the procedures for the awards of contracting
authorities of public works, supply and services contracts, and
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water,

188. DIRECTORATL
GUN.
FOR (OMPETITION,
DG (IOMPLTITION
PAPLR:
CONCERNING ISSE
TS OF COMPETITION IN WASTF MANAGEFENT SYSTFMS
54, at 14
(2005). The Directorate General characterized the case as "concern[ing] a
municipality which was faced with a serious environmental problem because of
insuificient capacities to recycle building wvaste" and described the Court's decision as
concluding that a "State-granted exclusive right to receive building waste in order to
ensure a sufficient flow of waste for the new building waste tacility could be justified
under Article 86(2) [of the EC Treaty] where such exclusivity was required (and the
least restrictive ineasure) for the accomplishment of the mission of general econonic
interest." Id.
189. See Nicola, supra note 11, at 162, 178.
190. See generally (HRISTOPHER BOVIs, EC PUBLIC PROCURiMENT: CASE LAW AND
REL'ULAIo)N, ch. 3 (2006) (discussing the historical developmcilL of public

procurement regulation).
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energy, transport, and postal services sectors.191 Public
procurement restrictions consist of regulated procedures based
on the principles of transparency and equal treatment of those
making tender offers, two principles that also apply to the realm
of concessions contracts that are normally excluded from public
procurement directives. 192

In interpreting public procurement rules, the CJEU has
relied on the public/private distinction to enable or disable city
economic activities depending on whether the service provider
is a public or private company. 193 The public/private distinction
plays an important role in the interpretation of public
procurement provisions because, when the company operating
the service for the municipality is fully public it does not have to
follow EU public procurement rules due to the "in-house
exemption." In Teckal Srd v. Comune di Niano & Azienda GasAcqua Consorziale (AGAC) di Reggio Emilia, the CJEU held that the
in-house exemption is satisfied only when a municipality
exercises control over the public company that is awarded the
contract.1 94 The Court developed a test to assess whether the
191. Generally, contracting authorities are also public authorities, but not always.
Contracting authorities, as defined in Directives 2004/18 and 2004/17, have an
obligation to apply public procurement rules. See Directive 2004/18/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Coordination of Procedures for the
Award of Public Works Contracts, Public Supply Contracts and Public Service
Conracts, 2004 O.J. L 134/114, art. 1(9), at 127; Directive 2004/17/EC uof the
European Parliament and of the Council on Coordinating the Procurement
Procedures of Entities Operating in the Water, Energy, Transport and Postal Services
Sectors. 2004 OJ. L 134/1. art. 2, at 16. The category "bodies governed by public law"
are not necessarily "public law" entities in each Member Statc-this isa diflerent
categuory. The Court explicitly rejected this notion in C-214/00 and C-283/00 in which
the Spanish government defended itself by holding that ifit does not fall under
national "public law" it still
can be a "body governed by public law" under the
directives. See Commission v.Spain, Case C-283/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-11719; Commission
v.Spain, Case C-214/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-4700.
192. See geierally Sacha Prechal & Madeleine de Lceuw, Dimensions of Trasparency:
The Building Blocds fir a New Legal PrincpleP, 0 REV. EUR. ADMIN. L. 51 (2007)
(discussing transparency between public authorities and individuals in the European
Union).

193. See e.g., Frug, supra note 3, at 1061 ("[T]he public/private distinction no
longer justifies preterring corporations to cities as vehicles foi decentralized power.");
Odudu, supIa note 131. at 827 (arguing that how the Court applies a particular Treaty
provision . depends on whether it isbeing applied to public or private functions").
194. See Teckal Srl v.Comune di Viano & Azienda Gas-Acqua Consorziale (AGAC)
di Reggio Emilia. Case C-107/98. [1999] E.C.R. 1-8121. 1[50. The Court has established
that public procurement rules do not apply when a public authority uses his own
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direct award of a service to a company that is controlled by a
municipality can be exempted from the public procurement
scrutiny. 95 Subsequently, the Court has interpreted strictly the
Teckal test, which created an exception for "in-house providing"
of ser ices controlled by cities. 196
Almost five years after the Teckal decision, in Consorzio
Aziende Metano (Coname) v. Comune di Cingia de' Botti the Court
ruled against a small Italian municipality for violating free
movement of services laws and EU public procurement
principles.9 7 By directly awarding the maintenance and
operation of a gas network to a company called Padania and

administrative or technical resources to carn, out a contract. See Stadt Halle & RPLI
Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v. Ai6bitsgemicinschaft Thermische Restabfall-und
Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna (S (,t Halle), Case C-26/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-,
48. In Teckal, the Court considered the validity of a direct cornact with an interlocal
consortiun of 456 municipalities for the operation of the heating systems of the
buildings of the contracting municipalities. Tek al, [1999] E.C.R. I-8121, It 17-25. The
Court held that the granting of a public service to an entity in which the contracting
authority is itself a member issubject to the in-house operation exception, which in
that situation is simply extended to relations between a contracting authority and
enitics having distinct legal personality. The in-house tcst that the Court devised looks
at 1) whether the control exercised by the public authorit over the legal person is
similar to the control the authority exercises over itsown departments and 2) whether
the legal person concerned "carries out the essential part of its activities with
controlling local authorit." Id. 5 0. The exemption also broadens the scope of the
derogation to public supply and other inirastructure works.

195. See id.1[50.
196. See, e.g., Parking Brixen GmbH v. Geneinde Brixen & Stadtwcrke Brixcn AG,
Case C-458/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-8585,
b66-67(finding that a public entity is
transfrinmed by a municipality into a company open to private capital and controlled by
the market inore than the public authority); Stadt Halle. [2005] E.C.R. I-1,
1[49 (noting
that the award of public responsibilities to public-private companies does not fall within
the scope of the in-house exception and isthereore subject to EC public procurement
laws).
197. See Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v. Comune di (ingia de' Botti,
Case C-231/03. [2005] E.C.R. 1-7287, 11 19-20. 28. Commenting on Coname. the
Secretary General of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions complained
that:
This case highlights once again the unacceptable level of uncertaint) that
European local govenmens have to face whenever their own in-house
services are concerned. The Court of Justice keeps moving the goalposts. The
EU institutions are supposed to be neutral between the public and private
sectors in service delivery, but that isnot how things are working out in the
Court's case law.
Press Release, Council of European Municipalities & Regions, CEMR "Baffled" by
Court of.justice Ruling on Public Procurement Case(lu 28, 2005), available at
http:/i /wwT.ccre.org/
en /chanpsactivites idetailn ewsi 560.
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excluding Coname, a private company, from competing for a
bid for municipal services, the city violated the EU free
movement of services.0 s Padania, the company in question, had
a limited private partnership with the majority of public capital
held by several municipalities and the province of Cremona,
including Cingia de' Botti. The Court held that the principle of
free movement of services precluded "the direct award by a
municipality of a concession . . . to a company in which there is
a majority public holding." 199
The Italian government specified that the practice of a
small municipality creating a consortium with other cities to
provide public services in-house was necessary in that particular
geographic territory. 20" The Court was not persuaded by this
argument.20 1 Rather, because Padania was open in part to
private capital, the Court held that it was not a fuly public
structure shielded from the application of EU public
procurement principles.20 2 Because of the small percentage of
private actors participating in the Italian municipalities'
consortium, the Court defined the in-house company as a
private undertaking whose behavior was proscribed by the rule
0of the market.2
198. Conarne. [2005] E.C.R. 1-7287,
28. The preliminary question posed to the
Court by the Italian court was:
Do Articles 43 [EC], 49 [EC] and 8l EC, in so far as they prohibit,
respectively, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a
Member State in the territory of another Member State and on fireedom to
provide services within the Community in respect of nationals of Member
States, as well as commercial and corporate practices which are liable to
prevent, restrict or distort competition within the European Union, preclude
provision for the direct award, that is to say without an invitation to tender, of
the management of the public gas-distribution service to a company in

which a municipality has a holding, whenever that holding is such as to
preclude any direct control over the management itself, and must it therelore
be declared that, as is the case in these proceedings, where the holding
amounts to 0.97%, the essential preconditions for "in-house" management
are not met?
Id. 1[ 8 (alteration in original).
199. See id. 28.
200. See id. 1 25.
201. See id. 1 26.
202. Id. [ 25-26.
203. See id. 26. The Council of European Municipalities and Regions has stated
that "one of the Court's main arguments is that a municipaliy cannot simply award a
local task to a company which it and other local authorities own if this company is
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In Coname, the consequences that judges could have
foreseem amount to both selection of the board of the public
company and also to the quality of its services. The President of
Padania, who was nominated by the same left-wing coalition as
the President of the Province of Cremona, has been criticized
20 4
for making inefficient policy choices for the company.
Padania, however, extended gas services across its territory and
improved water quality rather than reduce the cost of gas and
°5
water services to consumers.2
In a subsequent case, Coditel Brabant SA v. Commune d'Uccle
& R~gion de Bruxelles-Capitale,the Court ruled against Coditel, a
Belgian cable television operator that had applied for a
concession to operate the network of the municipality of
Uccle.2 °1The city decided to sell the network rather than grant a
concession, at which point Coditel submitted a purchase bid
under the terms of the relevant tender. Coditel's bid was the
only offer that was in conformity with the tender, but it was also
the lowest."" Brut616, an intermunicipal cooperative society
whose members were municipalities, also responded to the call
partially 'open to private capital'" and that this argument is "baffling" because it "is not
based on the fact that a percentage of a public company's shares are actually owned by
a private undertaking, but on the fact that some of these shares atight one daT be owned
by a private company!". Press Release, Council of European Municipalities & Regions,
supra note 197. In the sane vein, the Council of European Municipalities criticized the
2005 Stadt Halle judgneint, calling it "an unbalanced prioritization of the market over
local democracy and self governincnt. [The Council of European Municipalities and
Regions] called for the law to be changed to respect the principles of subsidiarity and
local democracy." Press Release, Council of European Municipalities & Regions, Public
Services: The European Court of Justice Is Creating "De Facto Legislation Outside
Democratic Control" (Oct. 14, 2005), available at http:/iwww.ccre.org/en/ac talites
view/593.
204. Critics claim that the policy choices are dictated by his political ideology
rather than by a purely market rationale. For instance, a resident and beneficiary of the
gas setvice argued that the noncompetitive prices charged by the company tor gas and
water setvices resulted in hidden taxes on consumers. See Letter fiom Guiseppe Dasti,
Pres., Padania Acque Spa, I'utile Esercizio di Padania e Frutto di Buona
Ammninistrazione (Apr. 22. 2005), available at htp: //74.125.47.132 /search?q-cachc:_
locQj3cjmJl: vw.padaniaacque.it/download/notizie/050421 cronaca'%2520-'(2520
risposta.doc+giuseppe+milanesi+Padania+Acque+l)asti&cd= 1&hl=en&ct clnk&gl=us
(in which Giuseppe Dasti, tormner president of Padania. responds to this criticism).
205. See PADANLA

AcQUL

S.P.A.,

http://wN.padania-acque.it/padania-acque/

ChiSiano.asp (last visited May 25, 2012).
206. Coditel Brabant SA v. Commune d'Uccle & Rcgion de Bruxelles-Capitale
(Coditel), Case C-324/07. [2008] E.C.R. 1-8457, [ 9.
207. Id. 11 10, 12.
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for tenders-not with a purchase bid but with an offer of
affiliation. In response, the municipality of Uccle then decided

not to sell the cable television network and instead became a
member of Brutl6.2" s Coditel appealed against these decisions
by arguing that they violated free movement provisions in the
TFEU, the provision of nondiscrimination based on nationality,
and the related obligation of transparency, which precluded the
municipality of Uccle from directly awarding a public service
concession.
The Court held that "by becoming a member of Brutdl1,"
the city "entrusted it with the management of its cable television
network.''2
Brutdh1's income "[came]
not from the
municipality but from payments made by the users of that
network," which is a "characteristic of a public service
concession."21 The Court reiterated that the application of
[TFEU Articles 18, 49, and 56], as well as of the general

principles of which they are the specific expression, is
precluded if the control exercised over the concessionaire
by the concession-granting public authority is similar to that

which the authority exercises over its own departments and
if, at the same time, that entity carries out the essential part
211
of its activities with the controlling authority.
The Court found that because the above conditions were met,
the municipality of Uccle's actions were in compliance with EU
law. 212
In both Coname and Coditel, the CJEU held that
municipalities were not constrained by EU public procurement
rules when awarding public services to a public company. 2 '
These could benefit from an "in-house exception" if the
company providing the service is entirely public.21 4 In this case,
the public/private dichotomy allows the CJEU to draw the
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
by public

Id. 11, 13-14, 16-18.
Id. 24.
Id.
Id. 26 (citing Tckal and Parking Brixon).
Id.IT 27, 41.
See Coditel, [2008] E.C.R. 1-8457. 42: Coname. [2005] E.C.R. 1-7287. 12.
In the cases above, Padania Acque Spa isa company predominanty financed
capital under Italian law, while Brutdle is an interinunicipal cooperative

society among [hirt citiesowned exclusively by public authoriies under Belgian law.

See Coname, [2005] E.C.R. 1-7287,

5;cf Coditel, [2008] E.C.R. 1-8457,

16.
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distinction between private undertakings' behavior regulated by
EU law and public companies controlled by one or more
municipalities exempted from such scrutiny.2 1
These cases show how the CJEU draws lines enabling
municipalities, without having to follow public procurement
rules, to grant public services to public companies at the
expense of private ones. EU adjudication is not a neutral
application of the TFEU policing the powers of the Union and
its Member States. Rather, it is a way for judges to implicitly
shape internal state-local relations by favoring certain economic
interests rather than others. European judges are creating
distributive consequences on the territories in which the public
companies, formed by the municipalities, are managing cable or
gas services.
In these cases, European judges neglect to evaluate the
distributive impact of their decisions on city policies and to
21
evaluate the redistribution of power in national-local relations. 13
Policy arguments, such as national welfare goals, allow
judges to collapse conflicting city policies into statewide
policies: 17 Likewise, public procurement rules exempt cities
when they contract for services "in-house" by hiring
administrative bodies financed solely with public capital.
European courts depict cities as providers of welfare, as long as
they are mere creatures of the states. In contrast, when city
interests collide with statewide policies such as in Porto di Genova
and Conamr, the CJEU no longer depicts cities as public actors.
For instance, in Porto di Gen ova the Court characterized
215. See KENNEDY, supra note 10, ch. 2 (discussing public as opposed to private preClassical legal thought); Caruso, supra note 46, at 873.
216. This choice resonates with the US doctrine of Huntter v.City of Pittsburgh, 207
U.S. 161 (1907), according to which city policy should remain solely an issue of
d(omestic jurisdiction because municipalities are mere creatures of the state. See id. at
177-79; seealso RICHARD BRIFFAUIT & LA&
URIE REYNOLDS, CASES AN) MATERIALS ON
STATE AND LOCAL GOVFRNMENT LX/ 74-75 (7th ed. 2009) (reviewing the debate
regarding local self-government).
217. See e.g., Arnbulanz (;1cknerv. Landkreis Sfidwestpialz, Case C-475/99,
[2001] E.C.R. 1-8089,
66 (defining arnbulance services provided by the Ausuan
Ldnder as an SGE1 even when only one Landcr isinvolved, "provided that it does not
bar the grant ol an authorisation to independent operators where it isestablished that
the Inedical aid organisations entrusted with the operation of the public emergency
alnbulance service are manifestly unable to sati fy demand in the area of Ciergency
ambulance and patient transport services").
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unionized labor as a source for anticompetitive behavior and
collusion in the market21 8 In Coname, the Court characterized
cities as neutral market participants without a political and
public identity.
111. DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OFFREE MOVEMENT OF
WORKERS AND STUDENTS
Arriving at each new city, the traveler finds again a
past ojhis that he did not know he had: the foreignness
of what you no longer are or no longer possess lies in
waitfor you in fore gn, unpossessedplaces.21
European adjudication interpreting the free movement of
workers and the rights of EU citizens to move have steadily
expanded the scope of ELU law vis ! vis private and public
authorities. 220 Notably, this includes the freedom to provide but
also to receive serices, 221 and equal access to education for
European citizens. 222 The CJEU jurisprudence on the free
movement of workers and EU citizens has broad implications for
urban policies. Cities implicitly attract certain types of

218. See MWerci, Case C-179/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5889. This case is an important
precursor of the challenges posed by a possible trade union movement that could
ultimately limit those economic fieedoms guaranteed by the European Union internal
market. See Bercusson, supra note 179, at 280-81.
219. CAININO, supra note 1, at 28-29.
220. See, e.g., Angoncse v. Cassa di Risparnio di Bolzano SpA, Case C-281/98,
[2000] E.C.R. 1-4139 (holding Lhat Article 45 of the TFEU applies not only to public
measures, but also to private measures that discriminate against workers); Union
Royale Belgc des Socidtes dc Football Association ASBL v. Bosinan, Case C-415/93.
[1995] E.C.R. 1-4921 (holding Lhat the rules of a national sporting association of a
Member State cannot discriminate against players from other Member States).
221. See Luisi & Carbone v. Ministcro del Tesoro, Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83.
[1984] E.C.R. 377,
16. where, as underlined by CRAIG & DE BL RCA, supra note 22, at
792-93, the Court explains:
It tollows that the tieedom to provide services included the freedom, foir the
recipients of services, to go to another member State in order to receive a
ser ices there, without being obstructed by restrictions, even in relation to
payments, and that tourists, persons receiving medical treatinent and persons
travelling for the purposes of education or business are to be regarded as
recipients of services.
222. See, e.g., Gravier v. City of Liege, Case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R. 593; Forcheri v.
Belgium. Case 152/82. [1983] E.C.R. 2323; Donato Casagrandev. Landeshauptstadt,
Case 9/74, [1974] E.C.R. 773.
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residents223 They may also intentionally attract certain type of
workers or students by favoring their own residents over
outsiders in awarding local jobs and subsidies.224 Moreover, cities
might limit the access of local services to outsiders through
residence requirements because they fear that free movement
will attract higher numbers of outsiders desiring to take
25
advantage of their public services2
These local fears increased in 2004 when ten new Member
States, the former communist countries, acceded to the
European Union. Soon after the eastern enlargement, certain
stereotypes emerged in EU public opinion. For instance, the
"Polish plumber" refers to those workers coming from former
eastern European countries who, by offering cheap wage labor,
would take over lower-skilled jobs in the original Member
States.22' The "healthcare tourist" represents those EU citizens
that shop around for the best healthcare services in order to skip
the queue for healthcare in their home countries. 27 According
to these stereotypes, the fear in Western European countries was
that lower-paid workers would flood higher-paid markets for

223. See, e.g.,
RICARD FLORIDA, (ITILS AND THL CREATIVL CLAS (2005) (arguing

that cities that foster diversity and tolerance thrive because they attract the most
creative and talented Citizens, which in turn leads to economic growth).

224. See Schragger, supra note 132, at 1116-18.
225. See Natalie Shimmel, 1iVe/cone to Europe, but Please tay Oat: free wovement and
the May 2004 EApansion ofthe EL 24 BFRKELFY.J. INT' L. 760, 782-83 (2006).
226. See Martin Arnold, Polish PlumberSmbolic ofAll French ITear About Constitution,
FIN. TIMES (ILondon) (May 28, 2005, 3:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/
9d5d703a-cf14-11d9-8cb5-00000c2511c8.hml#axzzlyAVrNMP0 ("If French President
Jacques Chirac finds himself scratching his head on Monday morning, wondering why
so many voters rejected the European Union Constitution, he should know
immediately who to blame: the Polish plumber. This mythical, rarely seen figure has
become the symbol of everything that iswrong with thre constitution for the French
people, worried about an invasion of low-paid workers from new EU member states
stealing thir jobs and destroying their social system.").
227. See generallY Watts v. Bedford Primar) Care Trust. Case C-372/04, [2006]
E.C.R. 1-4325. The plaintiff in Watts was a British citizen who sought reimbursement for
the Costs of surgery she had in France after tie British National Health Service
("NHS") put her on a inonths-long waiting list. The (ourt held that the obligation to
reimburse healthcare costs from treatment provided in another Member State applied
there, and that in order to reftse to authorize a patient to receive treatment abroad on
tiregrounds of waiting [iie for hospital treatment, the NHS must show that the waiting
time does not exceed a medically acceptable period based on the patient's condition.
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services

while

consumer-citizens

would

travel

to

different

2s
jurisdictions to gain better welfare sernces 2
Through its free movement jurisprudence, the CJEU has
fostered or undermined these stereotypes by promoting social
dumping in wage labor or by upholding statewide restrictions to
free movement in healthcare cases.
However, judges have consistently overlooked city power.
This Section examines how the European Courts have
redistributed power and resources in a way that deeply affects
state-local matters. It foregrounds the overlooked local
consequences for the allocation of power and resources in the
free movement of workers and students jurisprudence of the
Court.

A. Local Effects of Free Mklovement of V4orklrs
The European jurisprudence of free movement of workers
and services underwent revolutionary changes in the last
decade. 2N These freedoms, initially only guaranteed to workers,
were expanded through judicial and legislative means to include
their families, job seekers, students, and, more generally, EU
citizens entitled to a variety of social welfare benefits as well as
23 0
protections to immigrants moving to different Member States.

228. After the 2004 and the 2007 enlargemient, a transitional regime on fr-ee
movement of workers has delayed the lull implementation the rights of migrant
workers up to seven years from the date of the accession. See (RAIG & DE |I RCA, sutpa
note 21, at 728.
229. See CATHERINE BARNARD, SUBSTANTAIE IAW OF THF EU: THE FOUR FRFFDOMS
(3d ed. 2010) (exploring the development of the right of iree movement in EU case
law): CRAI, & DL BRCA. supra note 21, at 741-45.
230. See TFEU, supra note 4, art. 45, 2010 O.J C 83, at 65-66. Article 45 of the
TFEU establishes that:
1.Freedom of movelent for workers shall be secured within the Union.
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination
based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards
employment,remuneration and other conditions of work and employLent.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of publi
policy, public security or public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;

(b) to move ireely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;
(c)to stay in a Memiber State for the purpose of employLent in accordance
with tire provisions governing tle employmient of nationals of that State laid

down by law, regulation or administrative action;
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The doctrinal structure of the free movement of workers allows
judges to balance EU free movement interests with statewide
welfare policies. In fact, Article 45 of the TFEU, which aims to
secure the free movement of workers and abolish discrimination
based on nationality, includes a limitation of such freedom
based on the "grounds of public policy, public security or public
health." 231 In using a proportionality test to balance free
movement against national mandatory interests, judges have
used policy arguments based on national welfare or public
policies to justify Member States' welfarist legislation conflicting
with internal markets goals.
Table 2 below traces the arguments mapped in Part I,
which judges have used to balance these conflicting interests.
Further, it adds the case law that foregrounds the local
implications of each case, and demonstrates the effects of EU
adjudication on state-local relations and among subnational
actors.

(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed
in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in regulations to
be drawn up by the Commission.

4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public
service.

231. See id. arts. 18. 45. 49. 56, at 56. 65-68 70. The provisions protecting the free
movement of workers and services are often overlapping due to the way the CEU
jurisprudence has interpreted and Article 18 (antidiscrinination on grounds of
nationaliLy),

Article

45

(fr-ee

movemenl

of workers),

Article

49

establishment), and Article 56 (iree movement of services) of the TFEU.

(freedoil

of
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Table 2. Policy Arguments and Case Law on Free Movement and
Competition Law
STATE

INDIVIDUAL

National Welfare
Exceptions to Free
Movement of Senices

Public Policy
Exceptions to Free
Movement of Workers

SGEI Exception to EC
Competition Law

Public Service
Exception

Case Law with
Local Implications

Merci

Angonese

Private
Enhancing Free
Movement

Regulatory Competition
Free Movement of
Services and Workers

Rights of EU Citizens
Free Movement of
Citizens

EU Nondiscrimination

EU Nondiscrimination

Public
Limiting Free
Movement &
Competition Law

Equal Access to
Education
Case Law with
Local Implications

Ri/fert

Bidar

1. Some Distributive Implications of RiifJert
The recent trade union saga in EU law resonated among
Western labor lawyers and those expecting that CJEU social
dumping jurisprudence would prompt global reactions against
European integration: -32 In the International Transport Workers'
Federation v. Viking Line ABP and Laval un PartneriLtd v. Svenska
ByggnadsarbetarefOirbundet decisions, trade unions in Western
Europe challenged private companies that were trying to take
advantage of lower wages and worse employment conditions by

232. See Bercusson, supra note 179, at 279-80.
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hiring workers coming from Estonia and Latvia. 213 In both cases,
the CJEU rejected the challenges by the trade unions and held
that the respective Finnish or Swedish collective agreement
provisions could not restrict the free movement of services or
establishment without an overriding public interest justification.
On the one hand, scholars have commented that these cases
were explicit attacks against collective labor with the undisputed
outcome of creating a race to the bottom in worker standards
across the European Union. 23 4 On the other hand, scholars have
pointed out that former Eastern European companies that
could no longer compete for goods with Western European
companies viewed collective bargaining as an obstacle to workers
willing to offer cheap labor in order to enter more affluent
Scandinavian or German job markets. 235 The court was clearly
caught between both rationales. Despite upholding the
fundamental right to strike in I iking, both cases balanced free
trade versus collective bargaining by favoring EU free movement
at the expense of national or local labor protections.
The RifJetrt v. Land Niedersachsen case continued the labor
saga by introducing a local perspective to a decision very similar
to the Lavaljudgment. RifJfert dealt with the interpretation of
Posted Workers Directive 96/71, which regulates the movement
23
of workers posted for a limited time in another Member State. 6
Even though the directive was drafted to protect workers against
social dumping, particularly in the construction industry, it has
caused the opposite outcome in both cases. 23 7 The directive
233. See Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n v.Viking Line ABP (Vikirg), Case C-438/05,
[2007] F.C.R. 1-10779; Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska lyggnadsarbctareftrbundet
(Laval), Case C-341/05, [2007] E.C.R. 1-11767. The saga continued wvith Rajft, Case C346/06. [2008] E.C.R. 1-1989. and finished with Commission v. Laxenboug; Case U319/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-4323. Both Finland and Sweden accedcd to the European
Union in May 2004 as part of the Eastern European enlargement.
234. SeeJoerges & RCd1, supra note 179. at 14.
235. See Kukovec, supra note 106; see also Kukovec, spr#a note 94,at 5.
236. See Riiffert, [2008] E.C.R. 1-1989, 1[3: Directive 96/71/TC of the European
Parliament and of the Council Concerning the Posting of WorkCrs in the Framework of
the Provision of Services, 19970J. 1 18/1 [hereinafter Posted Workers Directive].
237. See Posted Workers and the Implementation of the Directive, EUR. INDUS. REL.
OBSERVATORY ON-LINL (Sept. 28, 1999), http://www.curoftind.europa.euieiroi 1999/
09/studyitn990920 s.htm ("The [P] osted [W]orkers Directive, which came into force
in December 1999, seeks to prevent free movement of labour within the [European
Union] front causing distortions of competition and bringing forms of 'social
dumping'. The basic principle ol the Directive isthat working conditions and pay in

1344 FORDHAM ITERNATIONAL LA WJOURNA L [Vol. 35:1282
allows only national or collective bargaining agreements,
"universally applicable," rather than local ones to apply to
posted workers. 2 8 The Court held that those labor protections,
which were not universal and did not apply to the entire
2 national territory, were not considered valid.
Riiffert concerns the conflict between the free movements
of serices guaranteed in the Treaty under Article 56 of the
TFEU, as performed by Polish construction workers posted by
their employer in Germany, and the requirement to pay workers
a minimum wage established by the local collective
agreement. 240 The interesting aspect is that the German Land of
Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) involved in the case adopted
higher labor standards in public procurement contracts than
other Lander.24 1 The goal of the Lower Saxony legislation, the
Landesvergabegesetz, was not only to provide minimum wage
protections for employees in public procurement contracts over
EUC10,000, but also to serve as a model to mobilize the federal
government to adopt a nationwide bill imposing higher

2 42
employment standards throughout Germany
The conflict among different Lander on labor standards in
public procurement contracts started in Germany in the late
1990s and lasted until 2000 when the conservative party took
power and only six Lander out of sixteen were able to adopt
24
higher labor standards in public procurement contracts. 3

elfect in a Member State should be applicable both to workers from that State, and
those from other EU countries posted to work there.").
238. Posted Workers Directive, supra note 236. arts. 3(1), 3(8), at 3-4.
239. SeeRiffert, [2008] E.C.R. 1-1989,
21-22.
240. See id. 1[1 10-11; see alsoM. Franzen & C. Richter, Case C-346iO6,Rechtsanwalt
Dr. Dirk RAfter{, in His Capacit) Liquidator of Objckt und Bauregic GmnbH & Co. KG
v. Land Niedersachsen, I2008] ECR 1-1989, 47 COMMON MKT.IL R.
537 (2010).
241. See Franzen & Richter, supra note 240, at 543-44 (noting that the
Landesvergabegeseh required a higher minimum wage than isnormally applicable in the
construction indusry in Germany).
242. See Ruijfrt, [2008] E.C.R. 1-1989, 1[1[
5-9: EUROPEAN TRADE UNION INST.,
RLPORT 111, VIKING-L AL -RFFERT: (ONSLQUENCES AND POLICY PERSPLCTIVES 37
(Andreas Baicker & Wiebke Warneck eds., 2010), available at http:/ilibra .fes.deipdffiles/gurn/00379.pdf. Ruffert resonates with the living wage initiative launched by
several Cities in the United States. See New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v.City
of New Orleans, 825 So.2d 1098, 1120 (La.2002) (holding that state law preempted the
local minimum wage); see also FRLG LT AL., supra note 124, at 216-20.
243. See Florian RCdl, The ( EU's RCIfiudgeentIL: A Case for "Undistorted"
Wage Competition 3-6 (2009) (unpublished manuscipt) (on file
with author). This
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Florian R6dl commented on this legislative patchwork in
Germany explaining that"[tihe main political reason for this
mixed picture is that the question of 'collective agreement
2 44
declarations' is highly contested inside the conservative party. "
In Ri#fJket, the Land of Lower Saxony awarded a public
procurement contract to build G6ttingen-Rosdorf prison to a
German contractor who employed a subcontractor established
in Poland.215 The German company signed a contract for an
amount of over eight million euros that included standard labor
provisions deployed in public contracting tenders. These
provisions required that the contractor and its subcontractors
would commit to pay workers the remuneration prescribed by
the collective agreement in the place where the obligation was
performed. Moreover, Lower Saxony could impose a penalty or
terminate the contract in case local labor standards were not
respected:24 When the government of Lower Saxony found that
the contractor had employed a subcontractor who had hired
fifty-three Polish workers at about half of the minimum wage
established by the local collective agreement, it issued a penalty
notice of approximately EU85,000 and terminated the
contract.

24 7

The question before the CJEU was whether Lower Saxony's
higher labor standards in public procurement contracts were
consistent with the ELU free movement of services and the
derogations of the Posted Workers Directive248 The Court, in
sharp opposition with the opinion of AG Bot, held that the
Landesvergabegesetz did not comply with the Posted Workers
Directive interpreted in light of the freedom to provide services
of Article 56 of the TFEU.24 1 The Court first rejected a public
article was published in Italian as Florian RdI, La Corte di Giustizia CL nt Caso Rajfert:
Per ta "Non Distorsione" delta Concorrenza in Materia Salariale, in ii CONFIITO
SBILANCLATO: LDBLRT. ECONOMICHE L AUTONOML, COLLLTTIVATRA ORDINATMENTO
COMUNIITARIO E ORDINAMENTI NAZIONAI 131 (Virnercati Aurora ed., 2009).

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
(enabling

RCd1, supar note 243, at 6 n.15.
See Riiffert. [2008] E.C.R. 1-1989, 1 10.
Id It G-9, 11.
Id. 1 11-12.
See id. [ 13-16; see also TFEU, ,upanote 4. art. 56, 2010 O]. C 83, at 70
the Council, acting by a qualified majorit on a proposal from the

Commission. to extend the provisions of the Chapter to nationals of a third country).
249. See Rfffert, [2008] E.C.R. 1-1989, [ 38-43; see also TFEU, supra note 4, art.
56, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 70 (- [R]estrictions on freedom to provide services within the
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policy argument made by the German government arguing that
the restriction promoted by the Lower Saxony law was justified
by the "objective of ensuring protection for independence in
the organisation of working life by trade unions. "2' 5 1 Then it
rejected, for lack of evidence, the German government's
national welfare argument that the provisions of the Land aimed
at "ensuring the financial balance of the social security systems
[that] . . .depends on the level of workers' salaries.'" 251 Finally,
it held that because these provisions only covered public and not
private contracts and the minimum wage protections were
geographically limited to the territory of Lower Saxony, rather
than being "universally applicable" on the entire German
territory, the restrictions could not fall under the exception of
the Posted Workers Directive252
The reactions to the Riiffertjudgment were numerous and
varied. First, it is significant that in 2009 even Mario Monti, an
economist who is now the Prime Minister of Italy, noticed the
polarization between on pro-workers advocates on the Left,
versus pro-employers advocates on the Right:25 Other critics
highlighted the fact that the Posted Workers Directive does not
cover substantive labor protections but recognizes only
"national" minimum standards, and thus undermines a long
tradition in Europe of decentralization and pluralism in labor

Union shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established
in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the sexvices are intended.").
But see Opinion of Advocate Gencral Bot, Rifjrt, [2008] E.C.R. at 1-1993, 1 5 (arguing
that neither the Posted Workers Directive nor Article 56 of the TFEU "must be
interpreted as precluding a national measure such as the one at issue").
250. R;fjert. [2008] E.C.R. 1-1989, 1[41.
251. Id.[ 42.
252. See id. 29; seealso Posted Workers Directive, supra note 236.

253. See EUR. IARI1AMENT, THE IMPACT OF THL ECJ JD(EMLNTS ON VIKING,

LAvAL. RFFERT AND LU -EMBOURGON THE PRACTICE OF COIJECTAE BARGAINING ANT)
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAI ACTION 13 (2010) ("As pointed out in the Monti Report,
the Laval-quartet has revived the dide
between advocates of greater market
integration and those who feel that the call for economic freedoms and for breaking
up regulatory barriers is code for dismantling social rights protected at national
level."); see also Michelle Meyer,Rfiffrt v. Land Niedersachsen: The ECJs DCpartuefom

Traditional Euopean Socialism, 32 LOY.L.A. INT'l & COMP. I. REV. 273, 284-86 (2010)
(enumerating arguments on both sides of the political split over this decision).
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law that have been dominant both in the Mediterranean and the
2 54
Scandinavian traditions.
The implications of RiiJfert were relevant to the internal
balance of power in the struggle between the German federal
government and the different Lnder. In striking down the
higher labor standard promoted by Lower Saxony, the Court
inevitably strengthened the already powerful position of those
Lnder that were against the minimum wage bill by completely
undermining the possibility of the law having a successful
255
outcome before the Parliament.
2. Public Policy Exceptions to Free Movement of Workers
An important limit to the free movement of workers is the
exclusion of public service employees from the realm of
application of the free movement provision included in Article
45 (4) of the TFEU.25 Local governments have a big stake in this
provision as public employment is one of the major ways to
redistribute resources for cities as well exert power through the
employment of civil servants.25 7 Over time, the Court has
substantially restricted this exception through a long battle
against the Member States in which it made it clear that it was
up to the Court to determine the content of the public service

254. See Alan Hyde & Mona Ressaissi, Unior I '-itho Bordes:: Recent Developments in
the Theory,. Practice and Lawy of Transnational Uoism (Rutgers Sch. of Law-Newark,
Research Paper No.40, 2009), available at http://ssrn.coL/absract-1323807.
255. See Rtdl, supra note 243, at 6, 11-12 (explaining that because the relevant
laws on public procurement are made at the Lnder level, after the Rfffert shock, the
LaInder have changed their provisions and at least some have tried to push things as tar
as possible: the best version of the social clause includes a minimum wage requirement,
collective agreements that are binding for foreign employers on the basis of the posted
workers legislation, and all collective agreements in the case of public transport,
because the sector is excluded from the market freedom to provide services).
256. TFEU, supr note 4,art. 45(4), 2010 O:. C 83, at 65.
257. In a Commission Communication on the restrictions in the public sector, a
number of healthcare, transportation, and commercial distribution works were
excluded by the exception while a number of judiciar), police, tax authority, and
diplomatic services could have been linited to Member States' nationals. See
Commission Communication on Freedom of Movement of Workers and Access to
Employment in the Public Service of the Member States, Commission Action in
Respect of the Application of Alticle 48(4) of the EEC Trea), 1988 O:J. C 72/02, aL 3
[hereinafter Freedom of Movement Communication].
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exception258 Initially, the Court upheld this restriction by
linking the job requirements to "a special relationship of
allegiance to the State and reciprocity of rights and duties which
form the foundation of the bond of nationality." 259 In
subsequent cases, however, the Court held that the same jobs
were not protected by the public service exception with the
exclusion of supervisory posts, night watchmen, and the
2
architect for the city of Brussels. t6)
Even though the Court has upheld the public service
exception in very limited cases, especially for highly skilled jobs
or in particular territorial circumstances, 26bthe Court has shown
the irrelevance of a nationality requirement to perform services
such as nurses in public hospitals262 Today, local governments
still maintain some power to limit local job access to their
nationals rather than their residents, especially for higher skilled
jobs or in some other sensitive areas in which the local scale
plays a role, such as police work or the city architect. 26- The
258. See, e.g., Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost, Case 152/73. [1974] E.C.R. 153. at
159-60.
259. Commission v. Belgium (I), Case 149/79, [1980] E.C.R. 3881. 1[ 10. The
Court ruled that it (lid not have enough inforinmation to decide the specific case but
interpreted the requirement of a "bond of nationality" and invited Belgium national
courts to decide in light of its reasoning. Id.
260. See, e.g., Commission v. Belgium (11), Case 149/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1845. [ 11.
261. See e.g , Commission v. Luxembourg, Case C-473/93, [1996] E.C.R. 1-3207,
[[ 32-35 (discussing Luxembourg's argument that tihe public service exception was
adopted tor teachers who had to preserve tite identity of the people tion a small
geographical territory and population). On the functional approach of the CIEU, see
BARNARD, .supra note 229, at 482.
262. See Commission v. France, Case 307/84. [1986] E.C.R. 1725. In this case. the
French government argued in favor of the nurses having French nationality because of
1 ules [sutch as the] principle of unity of tie public service. [and] tie fact that the civil
service is governed by public law ... which are specifically intended to ensure that tihe
public sevice seves as an instrument for giving eflect to the public interest." Id. 8.
However, the Court held that "by restricting to its own nationals appointnent and
establishment in permanent employment as a nurse in a public hospital." France had
violated the Treaty's free movement provisions. Id.
16-17. As Advocate General
Mancini stated in his opinion for this case: "It is a fact that an extremist disciple of
Hegel might uuly think that access to posts like the ones at issue here should be denied
to foreigners." Opinion of Advocate General Mancini, France, [1986] E.C.R. 1726, 7.
263. In the United States, Supreme Court jurisprudence has shielded
protectionist local measures protecting local jobs under tie market participant
exception. In White v. Masachusetts Council oj Cor s, ,tr Employers, for example, the
Rehnquist Court considered an order by the mayor of Boston that required work crews
on all consuuction projects funded by the city and all federal grants fully administered
to consist of at least half city residents. 460 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1983). The Rehnquist
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territorial dimension of these cases appears relevant, yet in its
decisions the Court has not taken it into account. A clear
example of such judicial behavior emerges in cases concerning
linguistic requirements, where the distinction between a
national language versus a dialect or a local language ends up
4
making a significant difference in outcomes.26
In Groener v. Ministerfor Education,for example, the plaintiff
was required to speak Irish (Gaelic) to be hired as an art
instructor at a school in Dublin265 The CJEU ruled that such
requirements were proportionate because the national policy in
question did not impose any requirement that the linguistic
knowledge be acquired in the territory. The CJEU held that this
linguistic requirement was not an indirect discrimination but
rather a legitimate demand as long as those skills could be
obtained through equivalent qualifications .26' The CJEU was
asked to balance the European free movement of workers
against Irish protectionism supported by the winning public
policy argument that the national measure was extending the
constitutional protection granted to Gaelic, the national
7
language protected by the Irish constitution.2
In contrast, in Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzaio SpA,
the linguistic barrier to access the job market had a clear local
Court held that the order did not violate the Commerce Clause if the Cit, by spending
its own money, was a market participant rather than a regulator of the market. Id. at
210, 214-15. However. in a subsequet case. ( -ited BuildingI- & Construction Trades
Council ofjCamden v. Camden, the Rehnquist Court considered a local ordinance
requiring at least torty percent of the contractors and subcontractors' tor the city's
construction projects to be city residents. 465 U.S. 208, 210 (1984). The Court rejected
the citys argument that the ordinance sought to prevent the "middle class ilight" from
the City into the suburbs, declaring that the ordinance could be discriminatory under
the Privileges and Inunities Clause. Id. at 223. The Court remanded the case to the
New Jersey Supreme Court. See id.;
see also Schragger, supra note 132, at 1112-13 ("The
Court [in Camden]... held that state and municipal labor residency requirements

should be treated the same; the protection aftorded by the in-state political processes to
out-of-state residents was too 'uncertain' to be relied upon. The Camden case thus
extended the nondiscrimination rule to Cities and the Court sent the case back to the
district courL to determine whether Camiden's statutc was justified and narrowly
tailored.").
264. In the language requiremnent cases. the Court isinterpreting the exception in
Article 39(3) of the TFEU, supra note 4, art. 45(3), 2010 O4. C 83, at 65 (allowing
limits "justilied on grounds of public policy, public security or public health").
265. Grocner v. Minister for Educ., (ase C-379/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3967. [[ 2-8.
266. Id.IT 20, 23.
267. Id.11 17-19.
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dimension. Here, the plaintiff was an Italian who was fluent 2in8
German and who resided in the Italian Province of Bolzano.
Italian constitutional law maintains that the Province of Bolzano
has wide regional and provincial autonomy due to its
geographic location at the border of Austria and its Germanspeaking minority2W The plaintiff was refused a job in a local
bank because he did not obtain the required German and
Italian bilingual certificate from the provincial government. The
bank in question was initially managed by the province but was
later privatized. 27° Angonese was an Italian worker whose mother
tongue was German and resided in the Autonomous Province of
Bolzano. He was refused ajob in a local bank because he did not
obtain the Italian and German bilingual certificate from the
Province.271 Clearly, this was a local protectionist measure
through which the local bank aimed to exclude those workers
who did not learn German within the bilingual Province of
Bolzano. In the Italian context of the time, this measure clearly
aimed to discriminate against Southern Italian workers, who
despite their knowledge of the German language were
prevented from coming to the richer Northern region to get
jobs.
The CJEU found that a requirement making access to the
job conditional on a language diploma obtained only in Bolzano
Province, without recognizing equivalent degrees, was not
justified and proportionate to the goals of the bank employment
policy.2 72 The Court held that Article 45 of the TFEU applied
not only to public measures, but also to those private measures
that discriminate against workers27 Thus, the attempt by the
268. See Angonese v. Cassa di Risparnio di Bolzano SpA, Case C-281/98. [2000]
E.C.R. 1-4139, 5.
269. The Region of Trentino-Alto Adige is made up of the provinces of Trento
and Bolzano, and constitutes an "autonomous Region, with legal status. within the
political structure of the Italian Republic." See Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige,
D.P.R. n. 670/1972 (It.), available at htLp:// Nw.provincia.bz.it/downloads/autonomy_
statutceng.pdt.
270. Angornese, [2000] E.C.R. 1-4139,
6, 9; see Leonardo Giani, Profili di
Efficieuzanel Completamentodella Privatizzazione del Sisterna Bancario Italiano: II Casodelle
Fondazioni Bancarie, 14 STUDI L NOTL Di ECONOMIA 269 (2009) (explaining the
privatization of Italian banks in the 1990s).
271. Angonese. [2000] E.C.R. 1-4139, [15-8.
272. Id.1[42.
273. Id. 36.
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Bolzano, through a local bank, to justify a discriminatory scheme
was not permissible. The difference in the outcomes of Angonese
and Groener lies in the relevance of Gaelic as the national
language recognized by Irish constitution, even though the
Gaelic requirement has an indirect discriminatory potential in
so far as it might be hard to acquire fluency in Gaelic outside of
Ireland. Regardless, the Court's bias in upholding national
measures that are protected by constitutions, rather than local
legislation, discourages judges for understanding the local,
national, and transnational implications of their decisions for
different groups of workers.
B. Local Effects of the Free M~ovement of Students
The expansion of rights guaranteed to EU citizens
happened through an activist adjudication of the CJEU
interpreting the free movement of workers and services. This
development prompted the CJEU to develop EU citizenship
rights arguments in support of the freedom to move or receive
private or public services without being discriminated against.
The EU principle of antidiscrimination based on nationality
enshrined in Article 18 of the TFEU has since become a central
provision in these cases because not only did it serve to
dismantle economic protectionism, it also acquired stronger
equality
values
among
individual
citizens2 74
This
nondiscrimination provision on freedom to receive services was
later incorporated in the Directive on Citizens' Free Movement
and Residence Rights ("CRD"), requiring equal treatment for
all EU citizens residing within a different Member State. 275 The
CRD consolidated the jurisprudence of the Court insofar as it
ensured a right of residence, through different periods of time,
274. See TFEU, supra note 4. art. 18, 2010 OJ. C 83, at 56 ("Within the scope of
application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained
therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited."); Catherine
Barnard, EU Citizenship and the Principle of Solidaritr, in SOCIAL WELIARE AN)D EU LAwv:
ESSAYS IN EUROPEAN I AW 157 (Michael )ougan & Eleanor Spaventa eds., 2005).
275. See Directive on Citizens' Free Movement and Residence Rights, supra note
109, arts. 27-33, at 113-19. In regard to thre frec movement of Citizens, Article 21 of the
TFEU coniers the right to "move and reside ireely within the territory of the Member
States" to citizens defined by Article 20 of the TFEU as "[c]vele
person holding thre
nationality of a Member State." TFEU,supra note 4, arts. 20-21, 2010 O:.. C 83, at 56-
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and subsequently ensured the right of residents to obtain social
benefits on equal terms with nationals. 276 This trajectory in
European jurisprudence puts new emphasis on the individual
rights of EU citizens with particular attention to their right not
to be discriminated against by the Member States.
1. The Activist Equal Access to Education Jurisprudence
Initially the free movement of workers included only two
categories of "economically active" persons: employees and selfemployed workers. The CjEU judgments, 277 followed by
Community legislative action, have progressively expanded the
right of free movement beyond "economically active" persons to
all citizens278 The jurisprudential work initiated by the CJEU
jurisprudence culminated in the CRD.2 79 In 2004, the CRD
conferred on EU citizens, and their families, the right to move
s°
and reside freely in the territory of the European Union.2 0
With respect to the mobility of students, there has been a
long CJEU saga challenging university discriminatory practices
that limited the right of students to access education.28 1 Since
276. The case law of the Court consolidated by the Directive on Citizens' Free
Movement and Residence Rights includes Trojani v. Centre Public d'Aide Sociale de
Bruxelles, Case C-456/02. [2004] E.C.R. 1-7573: Baumbast v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, Case C-413/99, [2002] E.C.R. 1-7091: Marffinez-Sala v. Freistaat
Bayern, Case C-85/96, [1998] E.C. R. 1-2691; Brown v. Sec'y of State for Scotland, Case
197/86, [1988] E.C.R. 3205.
277. See generally Trojani. [2004] E.C.R. 1-7573: Baumbast. [2002] E.C.R. 1-7091;
Ma'rzeiSala, [1998] E.C.R. 1-2691; Brown, [1988] E.C.R. 3205.
278. See Barnard. supra note 274, at 250; see also Annette Schrauwen. Sink or Swim
Together? Developments in European Citizenship, 23 FORLI-AN1 INT'L L:. 778. 787 (2000);
Strumia, s-pra note 113, at 716-17.
279. See generally Michael Dougan, The ConstitutionalDimension to the Case Law on
LhUon Citizenship. 31 EUR. L. RLV. 613 (2006) (providing an overview of Citizenshiprelatd directives and their relationship to the Court'sjurisprudence).
280. See generally Directive on Citizens' Free Movement and Residence Rights,
supra note 109.
281. In contrast, in the United States it is not considered a violation of the right to
travel when public colleges and universities adopt durational-residence requirements
tor in-state tuition. Such policies, upheld by the US Supreme Court in Saenz v. Roe. 526
U.S. 489 (1999), are based on the principle that tuition primarily reflects the
contribution that resident taxpayers have made to the weltare of the state. See Strumia,
supra note 113, at 741-42; see also Douglas R. Chartier, Note. The Toll for Travelig
Vdent: Darational-Res(,d e Reqauirents for In-State Tuition After Saenz v. Roe, 104
MI H. L. RL. 573 (2005). This vision of education as a service paid directly thirough
the residents' contributions is embraced by soLLe but remains problematic for others
based on dilferent theories of democracy. See FRUG ET A,., apra note 124, at 102-07
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the Maastricht Treaty, education is a matter that falls within the
shared competences of the European Union, although the
European Union has only limited legislative power in this
sphere. 282 The Commission has undertaken many initiatives to
address the mobility of European students, which remains
relatively low. 28 3 European adjudication has contributed to the
increase of mobility across national boundaries by strengthening
the right to access education. The Court has dramatically
changed in the last twenty years the status of European students,
who are not workers, but rather non-economically active
citizens. While the Court has recently begun to pay greater
attention to Member States' public policy and national welfare
28 4
arguments justifying restrictions to the mobility of students,
judges have overlooked the local effects of their decisions.
In the area of educational fees, which vary from state to
state, often with national and nonnational students charged
different rates, the Court has vigorously enforced the
nondiscrimination provisions enshrined in the Treaty and in EU

(contrasting James M. Buchanan's article "principles of1 Urban Fiscal Strategy" with
Frank 1. Michelnan's article "Political Markets and Community Self-Deterilinatln:
(omrpeting Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy").
282. Education in the European Union is regulated by Article 165(l) of the
TFEU:

"The Union shall contribute to the development of quality education by

encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and
supplementing their action, while lflly respecting the responsibility ol the Member
States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their
cultural and linguistic diversity." TFEU, supra note 4, art. 165(1), 2010 O:J. C 83, at 120.
In the domain of vocational training, Article 166(l) of the TFEU states that "[t]he
Union shall implement a vocational training policy which shall support and
supplemnent the action of the Member States, while fully respecting the responsibility of
the Member States for the content and organisation of vocational training." Id. art.
166(1), at 121.
283. The continuous efforts made by the Commission to promote European
education through policy coordination and the enhancement ol student mobility
policies has led to programs such as Socrates, Erasmus, and Marie Curie. See, e.g., The
Lifelong Learning Programme: Education and Training Oppotun-ies for All, EUR.
(OMMISSION,
http:/iec europa.eu/education ilielong-learning-programme/doc78_
en.htn (last visited Mar. 18. 2012); Research &. Innovation-\larie Curie Actions, EUR.
(OMMISSION, http:// ecc.uropa.eui/researchi /ariecurieactions/
(last updated June 22,
2012).
284. See, e.g., Bressol v. Gouvernement de la Communaute Francaise, Case C73/08. [2010] E.C.R. 1-2735: (ommission v. Austria, Case C-147/03, [2005] E.(.R. 15969.
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secondary legislation.215 In the mid-1980s, Gravier v. City o Li ge
became the leading case in which the Court took an
antidiscrimination approach towards enrollment or "minerval"
fees. 286 In Gravier, a French student wanted to study the art of
comic strips at the Acaddmie Royaledes Beaux Arts of the City of
Liege and applied for exemption from paying the foreign
student enrollment fee for higher art education. The Academie
Royale rejected her request on the grounds that "all foreign
students must be aware that such education is not free of charge
7
and must anticipate payment of an enrollment fee."28
The AG's opinion held that the Belgian rule constituted a
form of discrimination because it was based on nationality and
285. In particular, the Court has been interpreting in conjunction Articles 39 and
12 (the broad nondiscrimination provisions) of the EC Treaty and Article 7 of
Regulation 1612/68. which provides that:
1) A worker who isa national of a Member State may not, in the territory of
another Member State, be treated diflerently from national workers by reason
of his nationality in respect of any conditions of employment and work, in
particular as regards remuneration, dismissal, and should he become
unemployed, reinstatement or re-employment; 2) He shall enjoy the same
social and tax advantages as national workers. 3) He shall also, by virtue of the
same right and under the same conditions as national workers, have access to
training in vocational schools and retraining centers. 4) Any clause of a
collective or individual agreement or of any other collective regulation
concerning eligibility for employment, employment,remuneration and other
conditions of work or dismissal shall be null and void in so lar as it lies down
or authorizes discriminatory conditions
nationals of the other Member States.

in

respect of workers who are

Council Regulation No. 1612/68/EC on Freedom of Movement for Workers Within
the Communit,, 1968 oJ.L 257/2, art. 7. at 477 [hereinafter Freedom of Movement
Regulation].
286. See generally Gravier v.City of Liege, Case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R. 593.
287. Id. 1[5. The Acaddnmic Royale charged all its
students a yearly registration fee
of 10,000 Belgian francs, under a Belgian law that permitted "institutions of post
secondary or higher education," such as the Academie Royale, to "charge only low
registration fees intended to finance their social services." Id. [3; Opinion of Advocate
General Slynn, Gravier. [1985] E.C.R. 593. at 595. Additionally, the Belgian Minister of
Education had authorized "an enrollment lee for foreign pupils and students whose
parents are not resident in Belgiun and who attend a State educational institution,"
which included the Acadeinit Royale. Gravier. [1985] E.C.R. 593. 1[3. The enrollnent
fee fbr those, like the plaintifi, who were "undertaking fuill-time artistic education," was
24,622 Belgian fancs per year. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Gravier, [1985]
E.C.R. at 595: Gravier. [1985] E.C.R. 593. 1[5. "[S]tudents having one parent of Belgian
nationality, students of Luxembourg nationality, and students whose lather or mother
resides in Belgiun and carries on a principal occupation or receives social security
income or a pension and pays income Lax there" were exempted from paying the

enrollment fee. Gruvier, [1985] E.C.R. 593, 1 4.
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not on residence: "A Belgian national is never required to pay
the minerx al, even if he has spent the rest of his life outside
Belgium and even if his parents live out of Belgium and pay no
Belgian taxes." 2"8 The Belgian government responded that the
reason why foreign students in Belgium were required "to
contribute to the financing of education" was the imbalance
"between the number of foreign students studying in Belgium
and the number of Belgian students living abroad."22 9 In making
a national welfare argument, the government argued that "the
imbalance had serious consequences for the national education
budget," and because of that, the govermment was forced to
require foreign students, "who do not normally pay taxes in
Belgium to make a 'proportional contribution' to the costs of
education. '' 29° Nevertheless, the CJEU held that the national
measure was a form of discrimination incompatible with EU
law.291
The CJEU saga over Belgian educational fees continued
with two more cases involving universities in the Municipality of
Liege. In one case, Barra v. Belgium & the City of Lige, French
students who were taking technical classes organized by the City
of Liege sued the Belgian government because they were
required to pay an enrollment fee that Belgian students were

288. Opinion of Advocate General Slinn, Gravier, [1985] E.C.R. at 595.
289. Grvie , [1985] E.C. R. 593, 12.
290. Id. ("Far from being discriminatory, such a contribution puts foreign
students on the same tooting as Belgian nationals."). According to figures provided by
the Commission, Belgium had the highest percentage "of students who are national of
other member states, in relation to the total number of students" as compared to the
rest of the European Community. Id. 1 13. However. this data also showed that Belgium
was the only Member State that "require[d] foreign students to pay an enrollment lee."
Id.
291. Id. 26 (" [T]hc imposition on students who are nationals of other Member
States, of a charge, a registration lee or the so-called 'minerval' as a condition of access
to vocational training, where the same fee is not imposed on studcnts who are nationals
of the host Member State, constitutes discrimination on grounds of nationality contrary
to [Article 18 of the TFEU]."). The question that had been posed to the Court was
whether nationals of one Member State who go to another Member State to take
"courses in an institution offering instruction relating in particular to vocational
training are within the scope of [Article 18 of the TFEU]. IId. 9; see TFEU, supra note
4. art. 18, 2010 O:]. C 83, at 56 ("Within the scope of application of the Trcatics, and
without prcjudice

o any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on

grounds of nationalit shall be prohibited.").
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not required to pay.2 2 In Barra, the CJEU held that the
imposition of a registration fee on students who are foreign
nationals not only constitutes discrimination on the grounds of
nationality, which is contrary to the Treaty, but also that the
students were entitled to repayment from the City of Liikge.293 In

a subsequent case, Blaizot v. University of Li ge, involving four
main Belgian universities, the Court did not grant the
repayment of fees already paid but reaffirmed the
nondiscrimination
principle
and
the
elimination
of
discriminatory charges based on nationality.2 94 The principal
difference between Blaizot and Barra was that the plaintiffs in
Blaizot attended,
not technical colleges founded by
municipalities, but public universities, and the Court feared that
repayment would "retroactively throw the financing of university
education into confusion and might have unforeseeable
2
consequences for the proper functioning of universities." 95
Despite the important economic burden that these cases
created for the municipality of Liege, which had expressed on
several occasions the problem of French students taking
advantage of cheaper education in Belgium, the CJEU did not
take into account the local consequence of its judgments.
Instead, the Court maintained this jurisprudential trajectory
until resistance came from the governments of Austria and
France, 2 96 rather than from the City of Liege.
2. Some Distributive Implications of Bidar
What happens when a city or a municipality allocates
benefits, in particular education allowances, only to their
residents, who are also state nationals? When a regional or local

292. Barra v. Belgium & the Ct of Liege, Case 309/85, [1988] E.C.R. 355,

1 2-

3.

293. Id. 21 ("Community law preludes the application to students fron other
Member States who have unduly paid a supplemlentar cnrohnent lee of a national law
which deprives them of the right to repaynent if they did not bring legal proceedings
for repayment before the deliven, of the judgment of 13 February [985.").
294. Blaizot v. University of Liigc, Case 24/86. [1988] E.C.R. 379, It 24, 35.
295. Id. 1 34-35. In Blaizot the Court also limited the nondiscrimination
provision only to those students who were going to universities to receive vocational
training for a specific profession rather than improve their knowledge generally. Id.

1 19-20.
296. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 2 1, at 840-41.
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authority give grants to favor a certain group of nonwealthy or
historically discriminated-against groups living within its
territory, such aid aims to create incentives among certain
residents who have been historically less able to access higher
education. The landmark CJEU case, Bidar v. London Borough of
Ealing,is relevant in this respect.
The antecedent of Bidar can be found in Brown v. Secretaty
of State Jor Scotland, in which the CJEU resisted opening the
access of maintenance grants to out-of-state students. 297 Mr.
Brown had a dual French and British nationality. He lived in
France until he earned his bachelor's degree, and then went to
the United Kingdom in early 1984 where he worked for eight
months in Edinburgh, Scotland. In October, he began studying
to obtain a degree in electrical engineering at Cambridge
University, but the Scottish Education Department ("SED")
refused to award him a student allowance. Because of this
refusal, Mr. Brown brought an action against the SED "claiming
that he was entitled to the award of an allowance under
Community law." 98 By addressing the different scope of tuition
fees and maintenance grants, the CJEU held that while the
former fell within the scope of the Treaty, the payment of grants
for student fees does not. 299 The Court, and subsequently the
new Students' Directive 93/96, excluded maintenance grants
from the scope of the EU Treaty, thus limiting the mobility of
297. See Brown v. Sec'y of State oir Scotland, Case 197/86, [1988] E.C.R. 3205,
18. This Section will discuss the local distributive implications of Bidar rather than the
European or national implications.
298. See id. 1[1[ 3-5. The plaintiff based his suit on four provisions: Article 7 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, as interpreted by the Court in
Gravie, and Articles 7(3), 7(2), and 12 of the Freedom of Movement Regulation. Id.
53. The C EU held that university studies that prepare for a qualification for a
particular prolession or provide the necessary training skills constitute vocational
training despite the fact that universities are not generally considered "vocational
schools." Id. [ 10-13.
299. Id. 19. "Vocational schools" relers to the terminology used by the Freedom
of Movement Regulation. See Freedom of Movement Regulation, supra note 285, art.
7(3), at 477 (A worker who is a national of a Member State in the erritoly of another
Member State shall, "by virtue of the same right and under the same conditions as
national workers, have access to training in vocational schools and retraining centres").
According to the Court, "[t]he term 'vocational school' has a narrower meaning and
refers solely to establishments which provide only instruction interposed between
periods of employment or else closely connected with employment, particularly during
apprenticeship," which is not the case with universities. Brown, [1988] E.C.R. 3205,

1358 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1282

students receiving these grants. However, neither the Court nor
the directive excluded all other forms of assistance from the
scope of the Treaty, such as income benefits, housing benefits,
and child support. °
Bidar concerned a French national who moved to the
United Kingdom with his mother in 1998 and there completed
his secondary education without ever needing state aid. In 2001,
he enrolled at University College London. He received
assistance for his tuition fees, but was denied a loan for housing
costs "on the ground that he was not settled in the United
Kingdom. "I'l The CJEU held that:

[T]he first paragraph of Article 12 EC must be interpreted
as precluding national legislation which grants students the
right to assistance covering their maintenance costs only if
they are settled in the host Member State, while precluding
a national of another Member State from obtaining the
status of settled person as a student even if that national is
lawfully resident and has received a substantial part of his
secondary education in the host Member State and has
consequently established a genuine link with the society of
that state.""

The "genuine link" that the Court established in Bidar derived
from his right to reside enshrined in the CRD, rather than the

300. See BARNARD, supranote 229, at 282-83; Catherine Barnard, Case C-209/0". R
(on the application of Danny Bidar) v. London Borough of Ealing, Secretary of State
for Education and Skills, fudgnment of the Court (Grand Chamber) 15 March 2005, Not yet
Reported, 42 ONMON MKT. I. REV. 1465, 1467 (2005) [hereinalter Barnard, Case C
209103].
301. See Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing, Case C-209/03. [2005] E.C.R. 1-2119,
20-22. According to the national court, the plaintiff was not covered by either the
Freedoin of Movement Regulation or Students' Directive 93/96. However. the national
court asked the CEU for a preliminary ruling on:
Whether, given the decisions of the [Court in Lair and Brown] and
developments in the law of the European Union, including the adoption of
Article 18 EC and developments in relation to the co)mpetence of the
European Union in the lield of education, assistance with maintenance costs
for students attending university courses. such assistance being given by wa)
of either (a) subsidised loans or (b) grants, continues to fall outside the scope
of the application of the EC Treaty for the purposes of Article 12 EC and the
prohibition on discrimination on grounds of nationality)
Id.

27.
302. Id.

63.
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Students' Directive, insofar as he could demonstrate that he had
already lived in the United Kingdom.'
How far Member States can go in insisting on the existence
of a genuine link between a student and a host society is a
flexible requirement. This has changed over time, as in the case
of the United Kingdom, to more socially grounded
requirements showing the integration of the migrant student to
a particular territory. The reason behind this flexibility is the
possibility for the host state to impose a limit when a migrant
student endangers a particular welfare regime by imposing a
high burden on the host society. 30 4 Additionally, the CRD allows
Member States a margin of discretion to determine the length
of stay in the host state to qualify as a resident. For instance, the
United Kingdom changed its law in the aftermath of Bidar to
5
require a period of three years as a residence requirement.3
Finally, the fear that the CJEU would use the citizenship
provision to expand free movement through the principle of
equal access to education has been considerably limited by the
adoption of the CRD establishing that economically inactive
migrant students need to provide for their subsistence in the
host state. 30 Thus, the underlying lesson from Bidar is that the
distinction between fees and maintenance established in Brown
is still tenable and that the Court did not establish that
maintenance grants are to be provided to all migrant students.
In holding that the plaintiff could receive the maintenance
grant, the Bidar court linked "residence, integration and
solidarity: the longer migrants are resident in the host State, the
more integrated they are in the society of the host State in and
thus the more solidarity they can expect from the host State in
303. See id.
44-48, 55; Council Directive 90/364/EEC on the Right of
Residence, 1990 OJ. L 180/26, replaced by the Directive on Citizens' Free Movement
and Residence Rights, supra note 109.
304. See )ougan, supra note 179, at 972.
305. Some commentators have gone as tar as arguing that residency is replacing
nationaliy as the basis for membership in the community and access to its benefits in
the European Union, which is becoming more and more similar to the United States.
See Gareth Davies, "Any Place I HangMy Hat?" or: Residence Is the New Nationat', 11 EtUR.
L. 43 (2005).
306. In Bidar, according to some commentators, the (JEU has only "played
around at the margins" of the Residency Directives and 'judges as much as legislators
have accepted tLha significant limits remain to how far the host State can be expected
to subsidize the university studies of foreign nationals." )ougan, supra note 179, at 974.
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terms of benefits." °7 Yet, in establishing a genuine link with the
local community, neither the CJEU nor the Bidar commentators
have addressed the city policy implications of this case.
The maintenance allowance requested in Bidar was a
housing grant from the Ealing Borough. Traditionally in
England, local authorities such as county councils and borough
councils have had great power in designing education policies,
especially, though not only, for primary schools. Since the UK
Education Reform Act 1988, the twenty London boroughs lost
their power over higher education, with all polytechnics and
colleges of higher education becoming independent
corporations ,s0
Nevertheless the housing subsidy in question, which was
only allocated to students residing in the Ealing Borough, had a
precise redistributive aim in that context. The Ealing Borough is
located in West London and is populated in large part by
nonaffluent and immigrant populations.3 9 The resident subsidy
for students residing in that particular borough was probably
targeted to certain groups, such as the first generation children
of Polish, Caribbean, and African immigrants, rather than
foreigners. 310 But in the aftermath of Bidar the website of Ealing

Borough shows that housing allowances to residents going to
London universities were substantially lower.
These local redistributive polices are popular all over
Europe and not only in London but in many European cities.
For example, these are common in Paris suburbs, where riots
among poorer residents and immigrants resulted into the
burning of cars all over the city. This shows that local
307. Cathcrine Barnard, Of Students ad Babies, 64 CAMBRI)GE I
(2005); see Barnard, Case C-209103, supra note 300, at 1489.

.J 560,

563

308. See TONY iYRNE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN BRdTAIN: E\LRYONLS GUIDL TO

How IT ALL WORKS 93-95 (6th cd. 1994). See gnerly Frdig
HIGHER
EDU C.
FUNDING
inLroflttndinghighereiducation/

Higier Education,

COUNCrl
ENG.,
htLp:,'//w.hefc.ac.uk/about/
(last updated Jan. 3, 2012). The Higher Education

Funding Council distributes money to the independent universities and colleges and
monitors their financial and managerial health. See id.
309. See EALING COUNcIL, EALING (OUNCIL CORPORATE PLAN 2010-14, at 5

(2010).
3 10. See ONS Pplation Esjimtes b Eth',ic 'oap,

2001-2005, DATA MGMT. &

ANALYSIS GROUP UPDATL (Oct. 2007), htLp: //lgacy.london.gov.uk/gla/publicationsi
tfctsacdfigures/dmag-updatc- 02007-ons-thiic-groi i p-estinmates.pdf (providing
an
overview of the ethnic group populations in the London Boroughs fromh 2001 to 2005).
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government redistribution is important to maintain social peace
and is supposedly race-neutral, since subsidies are given based
on geographic rather than ethnic characteristics?1 1 In Bida, the
CJEU sets aside a local policy for being discriminatory instead of
giving to the Ealing Borough a voice in explaining the rationale
behind its housing subsidy scheme aimed at creating an
incentive for children of first generation immigrants to attend
local universities. In hindsight, if the Court had paid more
attention to the impact of its decision on the local redistributive
scheme perhaps it could have anticipated part of the current
resistance to its activist jurisprudence on access to education.
Finally, these territorial and distributive considerations are
not totally alien to the court. In interpreting reverse
discrimination and the nexus of a national measure with EU law,
AG Sharpston explained that redistributive territorial policies
ought to be balanced against free movement in light of how they
will affect the different communities of people that will be
granted or excluded from the subsidy.'1
CON\CLUSION
At times all I need is a brief glimpse, an opening in the
midst of an incongruous landscape, a glint of lights in
the fog, the dialo-ue of two passersby meeting in the
crowd, and I think that, setting out from there, I will
put together. piece by piece, the perftct city, made of
311. See RwVA KASTORYANO. NEGOTLITNG IDLNITIES: STATES AND IMMIGRANTS IN

FRANCF AND GERMANY 79 (Barbara Harshav trans., Princeton Univ. press 2002) (1997)
("[I]n France no measure is specifically oriented toward immigrants, their
descendants, or foreigners. at least not officially. In discourse. 'less' is determined
economically, like social handicaps. The state does not take account a priori of the
national or religious origin of families but, refers to all economically disadxantaged
families. Local actions are undertaken to improve neighborhoods and their image,
using various means: if possible, by dispersing the group that 'lowvers values' or by
encouraging the residents to participate in the neighborhood's social life. To calm
fcars and antagonisms, the less must be integrated into the more."); see also Danicla
Caruso, Limits of the Classical Met hod: Positive Action in the Eurpean Union After the New
Equality Directives, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 331 360 (2003) (arguing in favor of
redistribution based on the territory as more effective than national positive action
legislation of the type that the Court struck down).
312. See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Gov't of the French Caty. &
Walloon Gov't v. Flemish Gov't, Case C-212/06. [2008] E.C.R. 1-1683, 1-1687. j[ 129; see
also spra note 80 and accompanying text.
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Jagments mixed with the rest, of instants separated by
intervals, of signals one sends out, not knowing who
receives them. IfI tell you that the city toward which my
journey tends is discontinuous in space and time, now
scattered, now more condensed, you must not believe the
searchfor itcan stop., ",
In supporting deregulation in the internal market and in
deferring to national welfare schemes, European judges have
largely overlooked how their decisions redistribute power and
resources in state-local relations. In addition the structure of
legal arguments that judges have used to interpret EU internal
market doctrines allows them to collapse local into national and
European interests, or reduce cities into private market actors.
This practice makes cities invisible to EU law.
This Essay shows that when judges balance national welfare
or public policy arguments to justify Member State policies
against EU free movement principles, they have collapsed local
interests into prevailing national or EU interests.34 For instance,
in the Maastricht Coffee Shop case, the Court upheld a city
ordinance banning drug tourism that was highly contested at
the national and local level because the goal of the ordinances
315
conformed with the European fight against drug trafficking.
To contribute to the invisibility of cities in the internal
market adjudication, judges use regulatory competition and
citizenship rights arguments to enhance the free movement of
services and workers in a way that masks the deeper local
conflicts among cities, regions, and Lander. For instance, the
Riffert court held that mandatory collective agreements in
public procurement contracts administered by Lower Saxony
were incompatible with the Posted Workers Directive and the

313. CALVINO, supra.note 1. at 164.
314. This could have been the case in Angonese ifthe bank of Province of Bolzano
had not been privatized and would have required that instead of speaking German the
employee spoke the dialect in the region that is very sinilar to Gerimna. See generally
Angonese v.Cassa di Risparnio di Bolzano SpA, Case C-281/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-4139;
see also supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
315. SeeJosemans, Case C-137/09, [2010] E.C.R. I
(delivered Dec. 16, 2010)
(not yet reported); see also supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
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free movement of services.316 Rather than acknowledging the
internal political divide among the sixteen German Lander, this
decision weakened the position of six Lander that had adopted
higher labor standards public procurement contracts and that
were lobbying for the same legislation at the federal level.
By regulating the internal market, European judges
necessarily intervene in state-local relations by redistributing
powers and resources, even though they claim not to do so.
Rather than relying on a fiction of nonintervention judges ought
to understand the interests of local actors involved in each case
in order to decide what stakes they are likely to support in each
case. This is a hard, but not impossible, task that some judges
have already partially undertaken. It requires them to openly
acknowledge the costs and consequences of maintaining,
displacing, and creating welfare policies rather than relying on
the assumption that city interests can be identified within state
and EU interests or that they fully resemble those of private
market actors.

316. See RMiffert. Case C-346/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-1989; see also supra noles 236-55
and accompanying text.

